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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the development of a spreadsheet model that can be used by 
acquisition personnel to forecast the life-cycle costs of a weapon system under 
consideration for acquisition. It involves a case study of a major weapon system 
acquisition, helicopters for Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons, which provides 
the basis for the model. The life-cycle costs used are limited to the cost of operating and 
supporting the system once it has been deployed and represent the most significant costs 
incurred during the system's life-cycle. In an effort to assist the Program Manager in the 
decision-making process, decision analysis techniques are introduced. An "add-in" 
simulation software package allows the assumptions upon which the cost-estimates are 
based to take on a more realistic stochastic nature. From the simulation trial runs, 
distribution frequencies are generated which enable the cost analyst to establish a future 
cost with a higher probability of occurrence. Cost sensitivity analysis is also used to 
provide the Program Manager with a mechanism for establishing which assumptions have 
the greatest impact on costs and what happens when those assumptions are varied. The 
major finding of the thesis is that these decision analysis techniques can significantly aid 
the Program Manager in the decision-making process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.   GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The official end of the Cold War was decisively- 
punctuated by the resultant downsizing of America's military 
due to the disappearance of the ominous global threat and 
all of its associated military requirements.  But the 
outcomes of the Cold War's end had far greater implications 
than were first realized.  Probably the most obvious outcome 
was the decrease in funding levels for current and future 
military programs.  As the DoD drawdown continues, 
competition for scarce resources becomes an ever-increasing 
concern for not only DoD as a whole, but also for the 
individual military services. However, with the absence of 
the global threat as a measurement tool, military force 
planners are faced with much more uncertainty now than they 
had before.  The uncertainty arises predominantly out of 
lack of information on potential threats in the regional 
arenas.  Force planning today is more "uncertainty-pulled" 
vice "threat-driven" which results in a greater need for 
flexible forces.1 
This emphasis on flexibility and its underlying 
assumptions are not going to disappear anytime soon. 
Flexibility has become the key to accomplishing our 
strategic objectives in the future.  But, this flexibility 
does not come without a price.  Greater flexibility in this 
case translates into forces requiring rapid deployment, 
massive air lift, and mobile, high-firepower systems which 
will almost certainly result in increased cost.2 
Historically, the forward deployed Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) has been our nation's first response to 
crisis situations throughout the world.  The MAGTF concept 
has traditionally provided the flexibility necessary to 
counter many different threats.  The overall concept is 
based on "a combined arms organization structured to exploit 
the synergy inherent in closely integrated air and ground 
operations."3  A key element of the MAGTF's intrinsic 
flexibility rests in the Marine Light Attack Helicopter 
Squadron (HMLA). 
The mission of the HMLA is to provide utility 
helicopter support, attack helicopter fire support, and fire 
support coordination during amphibious operations and 
subsequent operations ashore.4  Currently, the squadron's 
assets include both attack and light assault (utility) 
helicopters to perform this mission.  Through the 
versatility of the squadron's assets, the HMLAs have 
provided the MAGTF commander with a degree of flexibility 
that can not be achieved by other economic means.  The 
weapons load on the attack helicopter, for instance, is very 
adaptable and can be tailor-made for the task at hand. 
However, the emerging Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, called 
Forward... From the Sea, is changing the employment concepts 
of the squadron and their aircraft. 
Currently, HMLAs operate the Bell Helicopter, AH-1W 
Cobra in the attack role and the UH-1N Huey in the light 
assault role.  The squadrons have operated some variant of 
these aircraft since the 1960s.  The existing AH-1W fleet 
consists of a mix of modified AH-lTs, which first entered 
service in 1977, subsequently upgraded to the AH-1W 
configuration and also new production AH-lWs which were 
first delivered in 1986.  The aging UH-1N fleet is composed 
of utility helicopters which first entered service during 
the Vietnam Conflict.  This aging of the airframes has 
resulted in inadequate performance on the part of the Huey 
and a limit in the future flexibility of the Cobra. 
New, emerging Marine Corps policies dictate that 
systems should be streamlined, modernized, and simplified 
without any appreciable loss of capabilities.  This has 
forged the way for a logical necking down of Marine aviation 
assets from the current nine different types of aircraft in 
operation to just three.  A strategy was crafted to 
accomplish this as efficiently and effectively as possible. 
The plan included the procurement of a vertical take-off 
aircraft (VMAO) that would fill the attack, utility, and 
observation roles while having flight characteristics 
compatible with the MV-22.  However, due to fiscal 
constraints created by the procurement of the MV-22, F/A-18 
E/F, and other, higher priority aviation programs, the 
development and procurement of VMAO was deferred until 
2020.5 
In light of the aging fleet and new concepts of 
operation, military planners were forced to analyze these 
effects on operational effectiveness.  The overall 
conclusion was that a recapitalization of HMLA assets was 
necessary to ensure that the required capabilities could 
still be maintained into the 21st century.  Current 
forecasts reveal that at the present rate of losses suffered 
due to mishaps during both peacetime and operational 
missions, the Marine Corps' assets will fall short of the 
required force structure prior to fielding of a replacement 
aircraft in 2020.  Furthermore, there are safety and 
performance issues that compound the effects of the 
declining inventory that must also be taken into account. 
In order to maintain its warfighting capabilities, it seems 
clear that the Marine Corps must develop a strategy to 
bridge the gap to 2020.  In addition, the effects of funding 
constraints and service life issues must be an integral part 
in the crafting of the strategy. 
B.   PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the past several years, there has been a virtual 
explosion in the use of analytical techniques in the field 
of management.  This development is due, in part, to the 
advent of powerful microcomputers and also to the 
increasingly complex environments in which we operate..  As 
the environment becomes increasingly more complex, 
decision-makers are forced to become more sophisticated in 
their decision-making processes.  These sophisticated 
analytical techniques, which includes regression analysis, 
time-series analysis, and simulation, are changing the face 
of decision-making.  New real world applications are 
literally cropping up everyday.  Where ever there is a need 
to make decisions in an atmosphere of less than perfect 
information, these analytical techniques may provide the 
necessary tools to make the most informed decision possible. 
The DoD acquisition process allows the mission needs of 
the user to be transformed into a weapon system that is 
affordable, supportable, reliable, and most of all, meets 
the needs of the user.  These needs are translated into 
performance requirements that the system must meet or 
exceed, balanced against some specified cost constraint. 
The cost of acquiring the system must be actively managed to 
ensure the lowest total cost possible.  However, there are 
probably several different systems or concepts that could 
both meet the target performance requirements and the 
specified cost.  So, how is the choice made between these 
alternative systems?  Or more importantly, can these 
decision analysis techniques briefly discussed above assist 
the Program Manager (PM) in his ultimate task of choosing 
the right system? 
This thesis is a case study which provides an in-depth 
analysis into the recapitalization of the HMLA assets.  The 
focus is on providing the PM with additional decision 
support tools to allow him to choose the most cost-effective 
means of bridging the gap until a replacement aircraft is 
fielded in 2020.  This particular case was chosen for two 
reasons: First, the program is in a rather early stage of 
the acquisition cycle which allows whatever lessons are 
learned in this thesis to still be applied: and, second, the 
rather unique alternative strategy of common components to 
reduce costs poses an especially complex issue. 
The objective of this thesis is to construct a simple 
forecasting model to facilitate the use of decision analysis 
techniques in an effort to provide data on the alternative 
systems to support a decision to acquire or not acquire. 
The model will be able to assist the analyst by taking all 
quantifiable factors into consideration and forecasting 
their impact on the process some time in the future.  The 
results of each alternative can then be compared and the 
final choice made. 
The remainder of this thesis will explore the 
acquisition process and how decisions are currently made. 
The results of NAVAIR's current method will be contrasted 
against the results of the model.  A brief overview of the 
acquisition process is included to give the reader an 
appreciation for the complexity of the process.  A 
discussion on the alternative systems follows. 
C.  ATTACK HELICOPTER BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The AH-1W Cobra is a twin-engine, two-bladed, 
tandem-seated, conventional helicopter capable of delivering 
a host of armament including the optically-tracked 
wire-guided TOW anti-tank missile, the laser-guided HELLFIRE 
anti-tank missile, and the infrared-guided anti-aircraft 
SIDEWINDER missile.  It is an aggressive high-speed 
helicopter built around its required combat mission.  The 
mission spectrum covers the air-to-air environment through 
the air-to-ground environment with multiple weapon 
suppressive fire.  The primary mission is that of an armed 
tactical helicopter, capable of search and target 
acquisition, low altitude high-speed flight, multiple weapon 
fire support, reconnaissance by fire, and troop helicopter 
support.  The helicopter is capable of performing these 
missions during day or night conditions and periods of 
reduced visibility, operating from both prepared and 
unprepared surfaces. 
The helicopter first saw combat as an AH-1J twin-engine 
variant of the Army's AH-1G Cobra.  The thinking of the era 
called for an aircraft that could support ground forces with 
a variety of armament, yet still maintain some measure of 
survivability.  The AH-1J was then modified to the TOW 
missile variant, the AH-IT.  Over time, the AH-IT had grown 
in weight due to the addition of various systems/subsystems 
that were effectively "bolted on", in contrast to a 
systems-integrated approach.  Additionally, Nap-of-the-earth 
(NOE) flight tactics and the expansion of the Marine Corps 
role in high-elevation, hot geographical areas, had exceeded 
the limited horsepower that was available in the AH-IT. 
The latest variant to be fielded, as noted above, is 
the AH-1W Super Cobra.  This aircraft is powered by two 
General Electric T700 engines capable of producing up to 
1690 shaft horsepower each.  On 20 June 1994, the Marine 
Corps fielded its first new-production AH-1W with the 
built-in night targeting system.  Developed by Tamam 
Industries of Israel, the upgrade was the first phase in a 
series of planned upgrades to the AH-1W system.  Currently, 
there are two more phases planned but not yet funded.  The 
next phase includes an upgraded cockpit with multifunction 
digital display technology replacing the present analog 
gauges.  The final upgrade revolves around a four-bladed 
rotor system that would dramatically increase the 
performance of the AH-1W. 
The alternative systems under consideration for filling 
the attack role are the AH-64D Apache and the RAH-66 
Comanche.  An aircraft overview is contained in Appendix B 
which compares key performance issues and costs.  The Apache 
is a production model airframe that has been in operation 
with the U.S. Army.  As can be seen from the cost chart in 
Appendix B, the production cost of this aircraft is close to 
the total cost of another alternative.  The Comanche is 
still in the developmental stage with many unknowns.  The 
conclusion on the attack helicopter was reached fairly 
quickly.  The Comanche's performance is comparable to the 
four-bladed Cobra, but with a higher production cost.  The 
Apache's performance is also comparable to the four-bladed 
Cobra, but with a much higher cost. 
D.  LIGHT ASSAULT HELICOPTER BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The UH-1N Huey is a twin-engine, two-bladed utility 
helicopter capable of operating from prepared or unprepared 
surfaces, under both day and night conditions and during 
periods of reduced visibility.  The helicopter can support a 
full gamut of tactical missions including visual 
reconnaissance, command and control, artillery observation 
and spotting, paratroop and rappelling operations, Special 
Purpose Insertion and Extraction (SPIE) rigging, and search 
and rescue (SAR).  The airborne observation role has grown 
out of the recent retirement of the OV-10 Bronco at the 
close of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 
The UH-1N helicopter is a Vietnam-era aircraft with an 
average age of 2 3 years and some 6,000 to 7,000 hours of 
flight time logged per airframe.6  This is beyond the 
planned useful life of the airframe. The age and hours on 
the airframes have resulted in degraded capabilities and 
performance.  "Mission creep" has also been a factor in the 
Huey's reduced ability to perform.  Mission creep occurs 
when, over the years, the weight of additional equipment and 
systems used for missions which the airframe was not 
originally designed for, is not compensated for by a 
corresponding increase in aircraft performance. 
Due to fiscal constraints, there is currently no 
funding available for a "New Start" replacement to the 
UH-1N.  However, with the aircraft no longer in production 
and an annual attrition rate of 2.3 percent, it is now 
estimated that the current Huey fleet will fall below the 
Marine Corps' requirements by the year 2002.7 By that time, 
it is estimated that the Marine Corps will need 10 
additional Hueys to meet its mission requirements.  These 
aircraft would probably have to be transferred from the 
Navy. 
A service life extension program (SLEP) has been 
planned to begin in 1997 to extend the life of 105 Marine 
UH-lNs to 17,500 hours of flight.  A 
service-life-assessment- program is set to begin this year 
in an effort to determine what the service life extension 
and upgrades will actually entail.  The current planned 
upgrades include: a four-bladed rotor system, upgraded 
engines, and an improved drivetrain.  If these components 
are identical to the Cobra components, then a significant 
cost-savings can be realized across the entire life-cycle. 
These common components would include structures, flight 
controls, engines, drivetrain and drive systems.  The 
current estimates on the savings "hover" around 20 to 30 
percent versus the acquisition of a new system to replace 
the UH-1N.8 
The light assault alternatives are much more 
competitive in respect to cost and performance.  The 
alternatives to the attack role were clearly not as good a 
choice as the four-bladed Cobra.  However, due to the common 
component strategy, the costs incurred by one aircraft will 
undoubtedly have effects on the other.  This makes this 
acquisition environment especially complex. 
The UH-6 0 Blackhawk and the variant HH-6 0H Seahawk are 
both production light assault helicopters.  The Seahawk is 
in operation with the U. S. Navy and the Blackhawk is in 
operation with the U. S. Army.  The key performance issues 
10 
and estimated cost data are also included in Appendix B. 
The acquisition of this system would result in a 
modification of an existing system to fulfill the unique 
needs of the Marine Corps.  From the chart, it can be seen 
that the performance of the H-60 variants is slightly better 
than the four-bladed Huey at an increased cost.  In fact, 
due to lack of data cost-estimates for the total cost of 
these systems has not yet been made. 
E.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2, 
Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures  and 
Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 5000.2-M, Defense 
Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports,   are used 
as the doctrinal basis for all defense acquisition policies 
and principles.  Cost Realism Handbook,   published by the 
Navy Office for Acquisition Research, is used as basis for 
evaluating estimated costs.  Defense Systems Management 
College publication, Integrated Logistics Support  Guide, 
provides the necessary understanding of logistic support and 
life-cycle costs.   Regression  Techniques  for Managerial 
Planning and  Control,   authored by Shu S. Liao, was used as 
the primary reference for decision analysis techniques. 
Reference data is collected primarily from Naval Air 
Systems Command, Program Management Office, Code PMA-276, 
and from interviews with personnel from Marine Aircraft 
Group 39, Marine Corps Air Station, Camp Pendleton, CA. 
11 
F.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized into six separate chapters and 
six appendices.  Chapter II outlines and discusses the 
defense systems acquisitions process.  Special emphasis is 
placed on developing an appreciation for the difficulty and 
complexity of bringing a major weapon system to the user. 
Acquisition strategies to include pre-planned product 
improvement, major upgrades to existing systems, and common 
components is discussed.  This discussion provides the basis 
for identifying and analyzing the relevant areas of the 
system life-cycle upon which the cost estimations will be 
based.  Chapter III provides an overview of cost estimation 
methods and forecasting techniques in use today.  The 
chapter attempts to forge common ground for the assessment 
of the current cost-estimates used by Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR). 
Chapter IV discusses the life-cycle elements identified 
in Chapter II as they relate to costs.  The current cost 
estimates used by NAVAIR are assessed for completeness and 
the data generated are validated.  The estimates may need to 
be adjusted to incorporate any new elements which were 
previously overlooked.  New data would then be generated for 
analysis. 
Chapter V discusses the costs analysis and relates the 
costs-estimates of NAVAIR to the cost-estimates derived from 
a model based on NAVAIR-generated data.  A comparison of the 
costs is conducted along with a discussion on the model. 
12 
Chapter VI discusses the conclusions and 
recommendations of the analysis.  The chapter closes with a 
recommended area for further investigation into the use of 
computer-based modeling and decision analysis techniques as 
a basis for future evaluation of competing alternatives. 
Appendix A is a glossary of commonly-used terms broken 
down into two sections.  The first section contains acronyms 
and abbreviations, the second section contains definitions, 
which whenever possible, are Department of the Defense 
standard definitions.  Appendix B contains the Aircraft 
Overviews and cost data.  Appendix C contains the Operation 
and Support Cost Element Breakdown Structure.  Appendix D 
contains the Life-Cycle Cost Assumptions.  Appendix E 
contains the NAVAIR LCC Estimates.  Appendix F contains the 
model and the forecast data. 
13 
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II. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM 
MANAGEMENT 
A.  ACQUISITION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The acquisition of defense systems is a very complex 
and detail-oriented process which provides a logical means 
of translating broadly-stated mission needs into 
well-defined system-specific requirements.9  These 
requirements are then transformed into a weapon system that 
is affordable, logistically supportable, and meets the needs 
of the user.  The process uses a strategic management 
approach of incremental commitment of resources, while 
decreasing overall risk.10 The following sections of this 
chapter attempt to give a very fundamental and abbreviated 
version of the acquisition and program management process, 
focusing on key elements that are crucial to understanding 
the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
Acquisition programs are managed from a structure that 
is separate from the normal operational chains of command. 
An acquisition program is described as "a directed, funded 
effort that is designed to provide a new or improved 
material capability in response to a validated need."11  In 
order to grasp how this process works, an introduction to 
the key players is essential.  The key players in the 
acquisition process are the program manager (PM), the 
program executive officer (PEO), the component or service 
15 
acquisition executive (CAE), and the defense acquisition 
executive (DAE).  The relationship between the players is 
illustrated in the organizational chart shown in Figure 1. 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE 
DoD COMPONENT ACQUISITION 
EXECUTIVE 
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
PROGRAM MANAGER 
Figure 1.  Program Management Hierarchy 
The Program Manager is central to the acquisition 
process and is responsible for ensuring that the weapon 
system meets the performance requirements necessary to 
satisfy the user's needs, proceeds on schedule, within 
specified budget constraints, and is logistically 
supportable.12  The program manager develops an acquisition 
strategy, plans out the program by generating the management 
approach to include: budgetary estimates and alternatives, 
program schedules, and day-to-day management of the program. 
The relevant elements of program management will be deferred 
16 
to a later section in the chapter.   Let us first discuss 
the acquisition process and how the key players fit into it. 
Defense systems acquisitions is broadly divided into 
two distinct functions: those functions necessary for the 
preparation of acquisitions and the formal acquisition.  The 
preparatory area consists of mission needs, requirements 
determination, and concept exploration and will be discussed 
in the next section of this chapter. 
The formal acquisition process is broken down into five 
major milestone decision points and five separate phases of 
acquisition as illustrated below in Figure 2.13  Normally, a 
program proceeds along this "text book" milestone line 
beginning with the identification of mission needs and 
progressing through the Operations and Support Phase. This 
encompasses the life-cycle of the system from its point of 
inception to its planned disposal.  It must be pointed out 
that not all acquisitions fit neatly into this progression. 
If several early steps can be omitted, abbreviated, or 
combined, significant cost and time savings can occur.  It 
should also be pointed out, that the Concept Exploration and 
Definition Phase is really preparatory in nature since 
technically, the program is not formally established until 
Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval.  The 
implications of each of these milestones and phases will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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Figure 2.  Milestone Decisions and Acquisition Phases 
MISSION NEEDS 
It can be argued that the complex world of defense 
systems acquisitions begins with a mission need or 
requirement from the "user".  This mission need is often the 
result of an intense analysis of a potential enemy's current 
or projected capabilities compared to that of the user. 
Threat analysis is a very important element in acquisitions. 
Without a bonafide, threat there would be no need to acquire 
a new weapon system.  A validated threat assessment is 
necessary at each milestone decision point and is just one 
of the criteria that must be met prior to the program 
continuing on to the next phase.  This is by design, since 
the time element of bringing some of these systems to market 
can span several years, during which time, the threat may 
change or even cease to exist. 
The Mission Needs Statement may be prepared by any DoD 
component which has identified a specific mission area need 
or deficiency.  The Mission Need Statement is then submitted 
to the operational validation authority for evaluation and 
validation.  For mission needs that could potentially result 
in a major defense acquisition program (acquisition category 
I or ACAT I), the Mission Need Statement will be submitted 
to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for 
review and validation.14 
It must be recognized that every mission need does not 
automatically result in the new acquisition of a weapon 
system.  As previously alluded, this path would prove to 
costly and therefore, identified mission needs are first 
evaluated to determine if they can be satisfied by some 
non-material solution.  Non-material solutions are usually 
in the form of changes in doctrine, tactics, operations, 
concepts, training, and/or organization.  These solutions 
may be viable and most likely represent the least costly 
approach.  Once it has been determined that an identified 
need cannot be satisfied by non-material means, a hardware 
option is then considered.  The mission need is then 
expressed as a broad-based operational capability as opposed 
to a system-specific solution and is prioritized relative to 
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other documented needs.  The broad-based operational 
capability enables us to refrain from being locked into a 
single solution and paves the way for the initiation of 
study efforts of alternative concepts.  This occurs during 
Milestone 0, Concept studies Approval. 
Once the minimum set of alternative concepts to be 
studied is defined, the acquisition moves on to the Concept 
Exploration and Definition Phase (Phase 0).  Various 
alternative concepts are explored in a host of studies and 
initial testing is accomplished to determine which concepts 
are the most feasible.  The Cost and Operational 
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) is accomplished to provide an 
analytical basis which allows a comparison of the 
alternative concepts on the basis of cost and operational 
effectiveness.  An Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
is generated for each concept that is set to progress to the 
next phase.  The ORD contains the performance and 
operational parameters for these proposed alternative 
concepts.  This represents the preparatory phase of the 
acquisition process.  We will now turn our attention to the 
formal acquisition process and elaborate on just how systems 
are developed and procured. 
C.  FORMAL ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Milestone Decision I authorizes the start of Phase I, 
Demonstration and Validation (DEM/VAL) and also establishes 
the requirements for the phase.  Now that the alternatives 
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have been narrowed down by previous efforts, the system is 
looked at closely in terms of performance, cost, schedule, 
and supportability.15 Multiple designs and parallel 
technologies may still be pursued, however, only the most 
promising solutions will be explored.  Prototyping is now 
begun and the acquisition strategy is prepared.  Life-cycle 
cost analyses are performed to identify and evaluate cost 
drivers and the impact on the overall system cost.  It is 
important to note that the life-cycle cost concerns are 
built into the process in the early stages.  The operating 
and support costs have a rather large impact on the overall 
cost as depicted in Figure 3.  Life-cycle costs will be 
fully discussed in a later chapter. 
TIME 
PROGRAM 
COST % 
COST 
INVESTMENT        OPERATING & ^^^ 
COST SUPPORT COST COST 
Figure 3. Life-Cycle Cost Components 
21 
The Concept Baseline is now approved and the 
cost/affordability constraints are provided.  DEM/VAL 
further explores the most promising solutions from the 
Concept Exploration phase, identifying and considering 
competing designs to take full advantage of  the economical 
benefits of competition. 
Milestone II, Development Approval, marks the start of 
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase 
and establishes the baseline low-rate initial production 
(LRIP) quantities, along with the specific cost, schedule, 
and performance criteria that must be achieved prior to 
exiting this phase  of the process.  The objective of the 
EMD phase is threefold: first, translate the design approach 
developed in DEM/VAL into a stable system design; second, 
validate the manufacturing/production processes; and third, 
demonstrate that the system produced will satisfy the 
minimum acceptable performance objectives.16  These 
objectives are accomplished by scaling-up the prototype 
model to full size and ordering a limited quantity to 
validate production techniques and quality.  Several of 
these limited quantity systems will be used for both 
operational and interoperability testing in an effort to 
verify the satisfaction of the minimum acceptable 
performance criteria. 
Milestone III, Production Approval, establishes the 
production baseline and approves entry into the Production 
and Deployment phase of the acquisition process.  This 
milestone involves a reassessment of life-cycle costs, 
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affordability, performance, and threat factors.  The 
Production and Deployment phase focuses on weapon system 
quality and performance.  Full-rate production of the system 
is achieved by shifting from low-rate production for testing 
to producing and fielding relatively large quantities, using 
assembly line methods.  The majority of the program funds 
are expended during this phase along with the implicit 
obligation of significant operations and maintenance funds 
in future years to support the fielded systems.17 One 
important note, the incorporation of any and all approved 
improvements to the original design is scheduled for future 
production lots during this phase.  The cost impacts 
associated with unplanned changes can be enormous. 
Milestone IV, Major Modification Approval, provides for 
determining if major upgrades to a system in production are 
warranted and also establishes the appropriate baseline if 
necessary.  Phase IV, Operations and Support, is actually a 
continuation of the Production and Deployment phase.  The 
objectives of this phase are to correct quality and safety 
problems, ensure the system continues to meet the threat, 
and identify any shortcomings or deficiencies.18 
Deficiencies occur when the system can no longer meet 
the needs of the user due to an improvement in the threat, a 
change in policy, or technological obsolescence and aging. 
In an effort to remedy the deficiency, changes in operation, 
maintenance, or training are generally looked at first.  The 
same rationale used for satisfying the original need is used 
here.  However, once again, if these actions are 
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insufficient to correct the deficiency, it may become 
necessary to acquire a system to correct the deficiency.  If 
the current system is still in production, proposed options 
are prepared along with new baseline data to support a new 
acquisition strategy.  If the current system is out of 
production, a new MNS will be generated and through the 
requirements identification process, the decision for a 
system modification or a new system start will be made. 
D.  PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Internal and external management of the acquisition 
process is as equally complicated as the process itself. 
Externally, there are a number of agencies that the program 
office must coordinate with daily.  Some of these agencies 
may ultimately decide the fate of the program including 
funding availability and performance/cost trade-off 
considerations. Internally, the program office is typically 
organized as a matrix organization.  Personnel from 
different functional areas are assigned to the program on a 
temporary basis.  The PM is able to draw on the individual 
expertise of the personnel to field the system within all of 
the requirements and constraints.  The different functional 
areas include: the projects division, the configuration 
management division, the contracts division, the engineering 
division, the logistics division, the program control 
division, the manufacturing division, and the test division. 
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Each of the functional divisions listed above has a 
certain responsibility in the overall scheme.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, however, the discussion of these 
divisions will be limited to configuration management, 
program control, and logistics.  The configuration 
management division is responsible for tracking the various 
technical baselines and managing the engineering change 
proposal process.  The configuration of a system, as defined 
in Acquisition  of Defense Systems,   is "its set of 
descriptive and governing characteristics that can be 
expressed in both functional and physical terms.19  This is 
an important point, since, the configuration of a system 
helps define a basis of comparing different systems. 
Program control is generally responsible for all of the 
fiscal and budgetary aspects of the program.  This 
responsibility extends to tracking the allocation of funds, 
contractor costs, and schedule performance and acting as the 
interface with any outside audit agencies.  Tracking the 
allocation of funds is a very important task.  During the 
execution phase of the budget, funds are expended on 
different aspects of the program.  Fiscal integrity and 
appropriations integrity, however, must be maintained.  That 
means that we can not spend more money than the program was 
appropriated, we can not spend money from one appropriations 
category on costs of another, and we must spend the money 
prior to the appropriations expiration. 
The logistics division ensures that the logistical 
considerations of the system are given top priority.  These 
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logistical considerations are directly associated with 
operation and support of the system after it has been 
deployed.  As will be discussed in a later chapter, there 
are major trade-off decisions between the acquisition cost 
now and reliability and maintainability issues later.  In 
order to make that trade-off decision, the system must be 
designed with support in mind early in the acquisition 
cycle. 
E.  ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
DoDI 5000.2 states that the primary goal in developing 
an acquisition strategy is to minimize the time and cost of 
satisfying an identified, validated need consistent with 
common sense, sound business practices, and the basic 
policies established by the DoDD 5000.1.  The acquisition 
strategy can be thought of as the method for acquiring the 
system and as such, there are several different methods of 
acquisition available.  These methods include: research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), non-developmental 
item (NDI), service life extension (SLEP), and pre-planned 
product improvement (P3I).  The method chosen has a large 
impact on the cost, schedule, performance, and 
supportability of the system.20 
The RDT&E approach to acquiring the system is probably 
the most costly and time consuming.  This is the approach 
depicted in the acquisition process of Figure 2.   NDI is 
probably one of the most cost-effective acquisition methods 
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available.  The basis of this method concerns acquiring an 
existing weapon system, sometimes with minor modifications, 
and adapting it for military use.  Systems that would fall 
into this category include commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) 
items that are purchased through commercial channels.  This 
approach saves much of the costs associated with developing 
the item from the ground up and the system may also be 
fielded in a shorter amount of time. 
The service life extension program involves 
refurbishing an existing system to prolong its useful life 
beyond the end of its life-cycle.  Frequently included in 
this method of acquisition is an upgrade program which 
allows the current system to take on some new capabilities. 
This is the basis of one of the acquisition methods used in 
our case study program. 
For the recapitalization of the HMLAs, non-material 
alternatives have been analyzed and evaluated by the Studies 
and Analysis Branch of the Marine Corps Combat Development 
Center (MCCDC).  The conclusion fostered a hardware 
solution: acquire an interim weapon system that will meet 
the performance requirements at the lowest possible cost. 
Alternatives were developed on the basis of obtaining the 
most performance at the lowest cost.  These alternatives are 
compared to one another and the system with the best overall 
performance-cost trade off is usually chosen.  This upgrade 
program has one additional dimension that must be noted.  By 
modifying one aircraft with components of the other 
aircraft, the proverbial "killing two birds with one stone" 
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may be accomplished.  This method may allow for an increase 
in the future flexibility of the attack helicopter while 
solving most of the problems of the aging light assault 
helicopter, and at the same time , causing a real cost 
savings.  This savings would be associated with a common 
component base for the operations and support of the 
aircraft after deployment. 
On the surface, this approach may seem cost effective 
and prudent, but are the alternatives a better choice?  That 
is the question which the PM faces.  The remainder of this 
thesis will discuss and explore how to aid the PM in making 
this choice. 
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III. COST-ESTIMATION AND FORECASTING 
A.   COST OVERVIEW 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the major 
constraint in the acquisition of a system is the funding. 
If unlimited funds were available, the procurement 
decision-making process would be quite simple; decide which 
system meets the performance requirements of the user, then 
merely procure as many as necessary.  Funding, however, is 
far from unlimited and the competition for these funds is 
very intense.  So intense, that in recent years, competing 
programs have been evaluated on the basis of "the most bang 
for the buck."  Funds are appropriated by Congress for the 
research and development (RDT&E), procurement (APN), and 
operations and maintenance (O&M) of the system being 
acquired.  Appropriations are permission to obligate the 
Treasury to pay for goods or services. 
Requests for funding are submitted in the form of a 
budget request.  Budgets are used to track the funds and 
ensure their effective and efficient use.  Ideally, budgets 
are based on the required costs necessary to satisfy some 
program requirements.21 And, in order to remain within the 
budget, the required costs must be aggressively managed and 
kept to the absolute minimum.  But what are these required 
costs and how are they identified?  Cost-estimation 
techniques are used to develop and identify the required 
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costs associated with a program and is the basis upon which 
budgets are formulated and revised.22 As defined by the Air 
Force Systems Command, cost-estimation is: 
The process of projecting financial requirements to 
accomplish a specified objective.  It includes 
selecting estimating structures; collecting, 
evaluating, and applying data; choosing and applying 
estimating methods; and providing full documentation.23 
With that said, it can also be stated that costs become 
the dominant driving force in the decision-making process 
for the acquisition of systems. Alternatives are evaluated 
on the basis of not only performance, but also costs. It 
becomes clear that cost-estimates must accurately reflect 
the financial requirements of the program in question. A 
program's viability can be seriously impaired if measured 
against a less than competent cost-estimate.24 
A cost-estimate has several characteristics associated 
with it.  There is completeness, reasonableness, 
consistency, and good documentation.  Completeness requires 
that all relevant costs must be included in the estimate. 
This means all costs incurred during the useful life of the 
acquired system must be used. These costs are known as the 
life-cycle costs of the system and will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter of this thesis.  Reasonableness 
pertains to the cost-estimating methodology and its 
suitability for the program element being estimated. 
Consistency relates the assumptions made in the 
cost-estimate concerning the acquisition strategy, and 
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documentation deals with clear, concise supporting 
statements used in the estimate. 
Cost-estimates are not restricted to the outset of the 
program.  In fact, it is important to note that the 
cost-estimating process occurs at a specific point in the 
life-cycle of the system and is therefore only as accurate 
as the information available at that point in time.25 
Keeping this in mind, it becomes evident that cost-estimates 
can and do occur throughout the life-cycle of the program 
and have several different functions.  One of the most 
important functions is to provide key cost information early 
on in the acquisition process.  At this point in a program's 
life-cycle, it is crucial to develop as accurate a 
cost-estimate as possible, because many complex and 
important decisions are made, based on this estimate, that 
affect the program throughout its life-cycle.26  The complex 
and important decisions concern choices among alternative 
systems.  DoDI 5000.2 states, "Cost estimates shall be 
comprehensive in character, identifying all elements of 
additional cost that would be entailed by a decision to 
proceed with development, production, and operation of the 
system."27 This is particularly true for the early 
estimates. 
As defined by DoDD 5000.4, cost estimation is an 
analysis and presentation of the future costs of an object 
or service, based on prior cost history of the same or 
similar system.28  In an effort to achieve accurate 
decision-making models, not only must the most relevant 
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costs be used, but the most accurate method of estimating 
these costs must also be used.  Cost-estimating techniques 
will be addressed in detail in the following sections.  The 
current popular methods used include analogy, parametric or 
statistical, engineering, and extrapolation from actuals. 
These methods are presented in respect to a hierarchy 
ranging from gross estimates to detailed estimates.  It is 
important to understand that a certain method may be more 
appropriate during one or more phases of the acquisition 
program.  Figure 4 illustrates this relationship.29 
D/V EMD PROD DEPLOY 
Gross Estimates Detailed Estimates 
Figure 4.  Cost-estimating Methods and Acquisition Phase 
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The analogy method uses elements that are based on a 
similar system.  The costs associated with that system form 
the basis of the costs of the new system.  Parametric models 
use elements of a data base to form the cost-estimation. 
Engineering models are the most expensive type and entail 
reducing the system to its components and each element is 
costed out.  The last model used, extrapolation, is very 
accurate since all of the data are derived from a previously 
produced version of the system, usually a prototype or other 
test article.  A major drawback to this model would be the 
timing of when the estimates could be applied.  Since the 
data are based on prior manufactured system, the system must 
have already been produced to obtain the cost data. 
However, this could only occur late in the acquisition 
cycle. 
It is important to note that these methods are not 
mutually exclusive.  Analysts are encouraged to employ 
alternative cost-estimating methods concurrently to expose 
hidden factors such as design and schedule risk areas and to 
reinforce the estimates derived.30  Remember, the object is 
to provide the most accurate cost-estimates possible within 
the constraints of time, data, and the methodology. 
B.   ANALOGY METHOD 
The analogy method of cost-estimation is based on a 
comparison of one system with one or many like systems. 
Specifically, this method compares a new system with one or 
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more existing systems/subsystems for which there is reliable 
cost and technical data.31  The cost analyst makes a 
subjective evaluation on the similarities and differences of 
the new system and some existing system or systems.  A 
relationship between the new system and the old system is 
assumed based on this evaluation.  To make the relationship 
as meaningful as possible, engineers and technicians 
normally provide a technical evaluation of the systems. 
Based on this technical evaluation which explicitly adjusts 
for differences in technological, operational, and/or 
logistical variables between the two systems, the cost 
analyst can make a more accurate assessment of the cost 
impact.32  In the end however, the resulting estimate is 
still based on subjective evaluations by both the technical 
staff members and cost analysts. 
The subjective nature of these evaluations is the 
source of some uncertainty in this cost-estimating method. 
Once again, the key here is to develop an accurate cost 
relationship based upon the technical differences between 
the new system and some similar existing system.  For the 
most part, these differences are qualitative at best. 
However, if for one moment we can assume that the technical 
differences can be captured quantitatively and objectively 
by the technical staff, thereby reducing the technical 
uncertainty of the relationship, the cost analysts must 
still determine the cost impact.  These cost impacts are 
still highly subjective and their results on the estimate 
can cause a level of total uncertainty that is quite large. 
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Due to the aforementioned restrictions, the analogy 
method is most suitable early in the life-cycle of the 
program.  Generally, this method is used during the Concept 
Exploration and Demonstration/Validation phases.  This is 
usually a time when actual cost data for the system in 
question is scarce or not available and may reflect 
uncertainty associated with the preliminary system design 
definition. 
C.   PARAMETRIC METHOD 
The parametric method also compares one system to 
another system.  However, this method differs from the 
analogy method in that statistical inferences are made when 
comparing the new system to multiple like systems.33  The 
comparison is made possible by a data base of like elements 
which shows a relationship between a particular cost and one 
or more cost drivers.  An estimate based on some 
representative system performance parameter or design 
characteristic is then produced by employing least squares 
regression techniques to derive a cost-estimating 
relationship for the performance parameter chosen. 
Two critical assumptions are made when using this 
method.  First, there is a relationship between the 
performance parameter selected such as speed, weight, thrust 
(independent variables) and the system cost (dependent 
variable) .34  Second, the requirement for a good data base 
is being satisfied.  The data base used must reflect "like 
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technology" to the system of interest and contain the latest 
most up to date data available. 
The parametric method is also useful early in the 
program life-cycle.  It has been generally used when a 
detailed design specification is not available, but a 
performance specification is, along with a data base of like 
systems.35  Due to the reliance on performance 
specifications and cost-estimating relationships, it is very 
simple to adapt this method for changes in the design, 
performance, or programmatic characteristics.  However, this 
simplicity does not come without its own cost.  If the 
assumptions outlined above are not satisfied, erroneous 
cost-estimates may result. 
D.   ENGINEERING METHOD 
The engineering method, also known as the "bottoms-up" 
method, is generally the most detailed and most expensive 
method to use.36  This method uses known and/or estimated 
costs of separate lower level items of the work breakdown 
structure (WBS) and sums them to arrive at an overall system 
cost.  This summation includes an adjustment for 
non-estimated elements such as quality assurance and system 
engineering to achieve the most accurate results possible. 
Work breakdown structure results from an analysis of system 
requirements and captures all products and services which 
comprise the entire work effort.  In other words, the 
analyst begins at the lowest level of identifiable work 
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effort with engineering drawings and specifications, 
identifying each labor task and materials necessary to 
accomplish the work.37 The adjustment is made by applying a 
multiplicative factoring to each of the separate lower level 
estimates. 
It must be understood that this method not only breaks 
the cost down to the lowest level possible, but also uses 
different methods of estimating these separate costs.  For 
example, the analogy method, parametric method, or 
extrapolation method may be used on an item to achieve the 
most accurate estimate possible for that item.   As with the 
other methods of estimation, the engineering method also has 
its inherent uncertainty.  This is due to the compounding 
effect of summing the adjustments made on the lower level 
items.  If the individual adjustments are erroneous, rather 
large errors can be produced once the adjustments are 
summed. 
E.   EXTRAPOLATION METHOD 
The extrapolation method uses updated cost-estimates 
based on actual costs of a prior production of the same 
system.  The technique involves the use of previous cost 
data gathered on earlier units of the same system.38  These 
earlier units may be prototype models used for developmental 
test and evaluation or units produced during low rate 
initial production (LRIP).  Low rate initial production 
provides production-configured units for operational test 
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and evaluation, establishes an initial production base for 
the system, and permits an orderly increase in the 
production rate leading to full rate production. 
This method of estimation is arguably the most accurate 
when the actual cost data are available.  This is because 
the earlier system is more like the new system than any 
other historic system.  But, the cost data generated from 
the earlier system is generally only available late in the 
acquisition cycle.  It becomes obvious then, that the 
further along the system is in the acquisition process, the 
more accurate the cost-estimation. 
Although highly accurate, this method still has some 
level of uncertainty associated with its use.  As with the 
analogy method, this method is also based on the technical 
evaluations of differences between the new system and some 
other existing system.  Even though this method uses a prior 
version of the existing system, the systems in question may 
not be totally the same.  Since by definition, the new 
production system may contain technical upgrades that either 
were not available for the prototype, or came about as a 
direct result of some shortfall identified during testing of 
the prototype.  Also, prototypes are generally hand-produced 
by high-level engineers and technicians.  Production units 
will be made on production floors by semi-skilled workers in 
much larger quantities with reduced costs.  These 
differences must be factored into the cost-estimate to 
obtain the most accurate estimate possible. 
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F.   FORECASTING TECHNIQUES 
The definition of forecast, according to Random House, 
is to form an opinion beforehand; to predict.  Although 
there are many different approaches to attacking a 
forecasting problem, there are generally only three bases 
for forecasting the future.39  "Things will remain the same" 
is always a possibility in forecasting future events. 
Analysts use the current trend as a template for future 
events.  The analysis of past history takes the first 
technique one step further.  This type of forecasting 
technique is known as time series analysis.  The most 
popular method, however, is to analyze the causative factors 
at work on the variable to be forecasted.  A relationships 
between the variable and the causative factors are first 
developed, then a determination is made as to the importance 
of each relationship.  Forecasts of this type are known as 
regression analysis. 
1.  It-Is-Going-To-Be-Just-Like-Now 
This method of forecasting is perhaps the most basic, 
but not necessarily the most useless.40  The assumption is 
that the factors affecting the forecast will remain the 
same.  This method generally has some merit when the period 
of the forecast is relatively short.  For that reason, this 
method is normally employed for short-term decision-making. 
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As the  forecast period becomes longer, the probability of 
the assumption holding true becomes smaller. 
2.  Time-Series Analysis 
Time-series analysis is based on the assumption that 
the variables to be forecasted have the characteristic of 
taking on a particular value at a particular time.  A 
relationship or pattern between the variable value and a 
time index is identified and used to forecast the variable 
value at some future time.  Two of the most popular 
approaches to time-series analysis are the Classical 
Decomposition Method and the Box-Jenkins Method.  In the 
Classical Decomposition Method, the patterns are broken down 
into smaller subpatterns which represent the different 
factors that influence the value of the series.41 
The Box-Jenkins Method is based on dividing the 
forecasting problem into three distinct stages.  First, a 
forecasting model most relevant to the problem is developed. 
Then, the model is "fitted" to the available historical data 
and evaluated for suitability.  If the model is found to be 
lacking, the process returns to step one and another model 
is developed.  Finally, once a suitable model has been 
identified, the forecast is developed for some future time. 
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3. Regression Analysis 
Regression is a technique of quantifying relationships 
between variables.42  The causative factors affecting the 
variables are analyzed and a relationship is developed.  The 
relationship is usually between a dependent variable, which 
is the one being forecasted, and one or more independent 
variables, also called explanatory variables.  The forecast 
is actually based on this relationship and any expected 
changes in the environment.  Once these relationships have 
been developed, a determination on their significance is 
made using some type of mathematical technique.  Those 
relationships found to be insignificant are discarded and a 
forecast is made on the relationship of the remaining 
variables.  Regression analysis is probably one of, if not 
the most, popular method of forecasting. 
4. Learning Curve Theory 
Learning curve theory is not derived from some 
theoretical construct, but rather is actually based on 
consistent observations of production cost data in certain 
industries.43  The phenomenon is, in reality, a special case 
of regression analysis and is acknowledged as a significant 
instrument in estimating costs.  Learning curve theory is 
not in and of itself a cost-estimating method, but instead, 
it is a technique for predicting how certain causative 
factors affect the variable to be predicted.  It is more of 
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a tool which allows the aforementioned methods to be more 
accurate.  Basically, it works like this: a worker learns as 
he or she performs a task; and as a worker performs a task 
over and over again, he or she becomes more efficient at 
that task resulting in a reduction in the amount of time it 
takes to perform that task.  There are many factors involved 
in this efficiency increase.  However, those most commonly 
mentioned are job familiarization of workers as a result of 
repetition, general improvement in shop organization/ 
coordination, development of more efficient parts-supply 
systems, and improvement in overall management.44 
It is important to note that the factors above are all 
related to labor costs and production.  In fact, learning 
curve theory's greatest utility is in estimating costs 
associated with labor and production schedules.  More 
specifically, when the cumulative quantity produced doubles, 
the cost per unit decreases by some fixed percentage.  That 
fixed percentage can be calculated and applied to other 
cost-estimating methods to provide a more accurate estimate. 
As with the cost-estimation models previously 
discussed, learning curve theory also has its limitations. 
As stated above, learning curve is normally applied to the 
cost of direct labor and production.  But with the advent of 
computer aided design (CAD) and computer aided manufacturing 
(CAM) techniques, less direct labor is necessary to produce 
the same or even higher outputs.  As automation continues to 
increase in the workplace, the effectiveness of learning 
curve will be reduced. 
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5.  Simulation 
In the recent past, the use of simulation in the field 
of management has been spreading swiftly.  Simulation is a 
forecasting technique based on a representation of the real 
world through a mathematical model of a system or process as 
it moves through time, encountering random events.45 
Usually the mathematical model is in the form of some type 
of spreadsheet application.  Model building is a difficult 
task for, the model must capture the most important aspects 
of the real world situation.  These aspects are reduced to 
some type of mathematical relationship, thus simplifying 
them and allowing them to more easily managed.  As alluded 
to earlier, the proliferation of the personal computer has 
caused a virtual information explosion.  Applications and 
techniques that were once reserved for large mainframes can 
now be handled with ease by most of today's personal 
computers. 
The forecasting in simulation is derived from the model 
moving through time and encountering random events along the 
way.  It is the movement and randomness that allows the 
simulation to mirror a real-world situation.  Monte Carlo 
simulation is among the most popular methods of simulating 
real world events.  Many add-in software programs offer the 
capability to run a Monte Carlo simulation on an existing 
spreadsheet model.  Simulation will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter V. 
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G.   NAVAIR ESTIMATES 
Now that the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
different cost-estimation methods have been identified and 
the various forecasting techniques have been described, the 
actual cost-estimation techniques used in this case can be 
introduced.  First of all, the cost-estimates included in 
this acquisition strategy are from multiple sources and 
therefore an inherent risk of comparing "apples to oranges" 
does exist.  This drawback is due to the data being gathered 
from different sources and not because of the different 
methodologies used.  Second, many of the estimates are 
presented as a range of costs.  These ranges reflect a level 
of uncertainty in the estimate that is normally part of 
early stage estimates.  The uncertainty is a result of cost 
uncertainty and does not reflect any  technical uncertainty. 
There are several relevant assumptions related to the 
cost-estimates of this acquisition strategy.  The following 
assumptions hold true for the recurring costs of the 
systems.  These recurring costs are limited to the unit cost 
of the system.  The assumptions used for the remaining costs 
of ownership will be discussed in the next chapter as part 
of the life-cycle cost discussion. 
1.  AH-4BW: 
♦ The engines and all of the avionics is government 
furnished equipment (GFE). 
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♦ 180 total aircraft are modified to 4BW configuration. 
♦ 24 aircraft are modified per year and common 4BN 
components are also in production concurrently. 
♦ All costs are in FY94 dollars. 
♦ All work is performed at Bell Helicopter using Bell 
composite rates and includes a 15% profit. 
♦ The costs are derived parametrically using Bell 
Helicopter analyses and validated by NAVAIR. 
2.  UH-4BN: 
♦ The engines and all of the avionics is government 
furnished equipment (GFE). 
♦ 100 total aircraft are modified to 4BN configuration. 
♦ 12 aircraft are modified per year and common 4BW 
components are also in production concurrently. 
♦ All costs are in FY94 dollars. 
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♦ All work is performed at Bell Helicopter using Bell 
composite rates and includes a 15% profit. 
♦ The costs are derived parametrically using Bell 
Helicopter analyses and validated by NAVAIR. 
3. RAH-66(M)/AH-64D(M): 
♦ The cost-estimates are based on additions to Army ROMs. 
♦ Technical baselines and aircraft configurations are not 
clearly defined and do not allow for an engineering 
assessment of design or marinization efforts to be 
conducted. 
♦ All costs are in FY94 dollars. 
4. CH-60(M) (H & L Baselines): 
♦ The costs are derived using top-level engineering 
assessment of the baseline aircraft with NAVAIR data and 
methods. 
♦ The unit costs are also based, in part, on a future 
Army buy of UH-60L. 
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♦ All costs are in FY94 dollars. 
The distinction of comparing apples to oranges is more 
readily apparent now that the assumptions have been 
identified.  We will return to these assumptions in the 
chapter on cost analysis and attempt to ascertain how a 
change in some of these assumptions can impact the 
acquisition strategy. 
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IV.      LIFE-CYCLE   COSTS 
A.   OVERVIEW 
The cost of acquiring a major weapon system is not 
limited to the mere purchase price of that system.  There 
are other costs associated with that system's ownership. 
For example, the ownership cost may also include the cost of 
purchasing spare parts, fulfilling training and manpower 
requirements, and disposal/retirement of that system at the 
end of its useful life.  These additional costs are very 
relevant and must be included in the overall estimate of the 
system cost.  As previously stated, in order to obtain a 
good cost-estimate of a system, the characteristic of 
completeness must be satisfied.  Therefore, all costs 
associated with the acquisition and ownership of the system 
are relevant and must be included in the overall 
cost-estimate of that system.  As defined in the Integrated 
Logistics Support (ILS) Guide, "Life-cycle cost (LCC) is the 
total cost to the Government of the acquisition and 
ownership of the system over its full life.  It includes the 
cost of development, acquisition, operation, support, and 
where applicable, disposal."46 
In the preceding chapter, methods for estimating the 
costs associated with the acquisition of major systems were 
introduced and discussed.  These techniques allow the cost 
analyst to make the most accurate cost estimates possible 
for cost significant decision-making purposes.  This means 
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that for decisions involving the.comparison of relative 
costs of design and acquisition alternatives under 
consideration, a comprehensive cost structure with accurate 
estimates must be used.  This is a very important 
distinction given that most, if not all of the decisions 
made during the acquisition process have some type of cost 
implication.  This chapter will attempt to identify which 
costs are most relevant and in need of estimation. 
Furthermore, the major assumptions necessary in estimating 
these costs and their implications will be explored. 
There are several different types of costs used in the 
acquisition process and in order to compare the costs of 
alternatives, a common frame of reference must be 
identified.  There is a hierarchy of system costs ranging 
from the procurement cost of a basic unit through an overall 
cost to the government or life-cycle cost.  Figure 5 depicts 
this system cost hierarchy. 
Design to unit production cost (DTUPC) is the 
procurement cost of the basic unit less spare parts but 
includes all recurring production costs.  Flyaway cost is 
the DTUPC plus any non-recurring production or 
capitalization costs.  Weapon system cost is flyaway cost 
plus the cost of any item required to make the system 
deployable.  However, weapon system cost does not include 
the cost of spares.  Procurement cost is the most frequently 
used cost and consists of weapon system cost plus the cost 
of initial spares.  The initial spares cover the first year 
of deployment and are funded through the procurement 
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appropriation.  Program acquisition cost is the procurement 
cost plus research, development, test, and evaluation costs 
and any military construction (MILCON) costs related to the 
system.  Finally, life-cycle cost is the program acquisition 
cost plus operating and support (O&S) cost and disposal 
cost.  Operating and support costs include any related cost 
of operations and maintenance (O&M) and manpower 
requirements (MILPERS) for that system.  The life-cycle cost 
represents the total cost to the government for the 
ownership of that weapon system. 
□ DTUPC 
D Non-recurring 
production costs 
FLYAWAY COST 
PLUS 
□ Tech Data 
□ Pubs 
□ Support Eqp 
□ Training Eqp 
COST WEAPON SYSTEM 
PLUS 
D Initial 
Spares 
PROCUREMENT COST 
PLUS 
RDT&E D 
a Facility 
Construction 
PROGRAM ACQUISITION COST 
LIFE-CYCLE COST 
PLUS 
a Operations 
& Support 
I D Disposal 
Figure 5.  Life-Cycle Cost Composition 
As discussed previously, the accuracy of a 
cost-estimate is based in part on the data available  at the 
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time of the estimate.  For this reason, several 
cost-estimates may be performed throughout the acquisition 
program.  In fact, a cost-estimate must be developed for 
each milestone review.  However, estimating the cost of a 
system prior to its development and production is arguably 
one of the most important estimates and usually has the 
least amount of available data.  Once again, production 
costs are not the only relevant costs used to base a 
procurement decision upon. Elements such as cost of spare 
and repair parts throughout the systems useful life, 
manpower costs associated with operating and maintaining the 
system, and training cost associated with providing training 
for effective operation of the system are also included. 
These are costs that are incurred after the system is 
deployed but, nevertheless must be estimated and included in 
the initial cost-estimate. 
It is obvious that accurate cost-estimates are 
necessary to permit the comparison of acquisition 
alternatives.  But, how do the decisions made now impact the 
future costs of the system?  And more specifically, what 
decisions should be made now to decrease the future costs of 
the system?  In order to capture and fully appreciate the 
future costs and the impact of current decisions on those 
costs, an analysis of the life-cycle cost is used.  First of 
all, the system life-cycle is divided into four main 
categories of cost:  Research and development (R&D), 
production, operating and support (O&S), and when necessary, 
disposal.  The ILS Guide identifies two goals of life-cycle 
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cost analysis: (1) To identify the total cost of alternative 
means of countering a threat, achieving production 
schedules, and attaining system readiness and performance 
objectives; and (2) estimate the cost impact of the various 
design and support options.47  These various design and 
support options are based partly on assumptions about how 
the system will be operated once it is deployed.  It is 
these assumptions which impact the design and logistics 
choices at the outset of the program.  Cost drivers identify 
the assumptions made and relate those assumptions to costs. 
This concept of life-cycle cost analysis is most 
effective in the early phases of the acquisition process. 
It has been estimated that on the average, roughly 85% of 
the systems life-cycle costs have been committed by design 
and logistics choices prior to Milestone II.48  It is 
important to understand that this represents funds 
committed, not funds actually expended.  Figure 6 depicts 
this relationship.  It is also important to note that once 
these design and logistics choices have been made, it is 
always more costly to modify them.  It would behoove the 
program manager to obtain the most accurate life-cycle cost 
estimate possible at the outset of the program to preclude 
cost increases later in the system's life-cycle. 
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Figure 6.  Typical System Life-cycle Cost Commitment 
From a life-cycle cost perspective, systems go through 
sequential cost stages.  As discussed above, the major 
components of the life-cycle are research and development 
costs (R&D), investment or production costs, operations and 
support costs (O&S), and disposal costs.  These components 
are further subdivided into lower levels of elements to 
better manage and track the costs.  As discussed in chapter 
1, the production and O&S costs are by far the most 
expensive costs incurred throughout the system's life-cycle. 
The systems we are acquiring are designed to meet very high 
performance objectives resulting in an increase in 
complexity and cost.  However, as the systems acquired 
become increasingly more complex, they become more difficult 
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and expensive to maintain.  Currently, as described in an 
earlier chapter, the operating and support costs related to 
operating and maintaining those systems has risen to an 
average of 60% of the total life-cycle cost.  This 
relationship is shown in Figure 7.49 
A more detailed description of each of these costs 
follows.  However, it seems intuitively obvious that the 
life-cycle costs with the most impact are the largest costs. 
That is, the cost with the most risk of variance from the 
baseline cost-estimates are the largest life-cycle cost 
elements.  From figure below, those costs would seem to be 
production and O&S. 
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Figure 7.  Typical System Life-Cycle Cost Distribution 
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B.  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
The costs normally associated with research and 
development also typically include the costs of test and 
evaluation.  RDT&E costs are normally most prevalent in the 
earlier milestones and phases of the acquisition process. 
These costs typically account for roughly ten percent of the 
overall life-cycle cost.  Under this process, the concept of 
research takes on many facets.  Some research is aimed at 
studying competing concepts and their ramifications, while 
other research is strictly examining technical issues 
associated with the design of the system. 
There are many formal studies undertaken prior to the 
procurement of a system.  Concept studies are used to 
determine if the mission need is valid and identify a 
minimum set of alternative concepts to possibly satisfy that 
need.  Concept exploration phase explores various material 
alternatives along with studying the impact the proposed 
system will have on the surrounding environment. 
It is important to note the source of research and 
development funding.  Chapter 2 discussed the funding 
requirements for major system acquisitions and the "pot of 
money" concept.  Currently, all research and development 
costs are covered under the Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation.  These costs include 
concept studies, technical research, and design. 
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C. ACQUISITION COSTS 
Acquisition costs include the cost of procurement and 
the cost of facilities.  Sometimes called production cost, 
procurement costs consist of the cost of a basic unit plus 
capitalization costs, support equipment, publications, and 
the cost of any system-peculiar training equipment. These 
costs are funded through a procurement appropriation and 
include the cost of initial spares.  The major cost-drivers 
related to procurement costs include selected design 
characteristics, performance requirements, and 
schedule/production factors. 
Facilities costs represent the costs of purchasing and 
furnishing the facilities necessary for deployment of the 
system.  These cost are funded by the Military Construction 
(MILCON) appropriation.  Costs associated with facilities 
usually take on an added dimension of risk.  The funding 
involved is historically characterized by long lead times. 
These lead times can range from five to seven years in 
length, which necessitates the appropriation of these funds 
well in advance of production. 
D. OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST 
As previously discussed, operating and support costs 
currently account for approximately 60% of the life-cycle 
costs of the system.  This percentage represents an average 
cost of many different programs and is based on about 60% of 
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the total DoD budget is dedicated to the support of 
operational systems.  Nevertheless, this still represents a 
great concern.49  Operating and support cost is defined as 
the costs necessary to operate and support the system once 
it has been deployed.  Typically, these costs include 
trained manpower, operating consumables, maintenance 
consumables, support- equipment, technical manuals, training, 
and spares.  A full O&S cost element breakdown structure is 
included in Appendix C. 
Funding of the operating and support costs is achieved 
through both the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
appropriation and the Military Personnel (MILPERS) 
appropriation.  The cost of spare parts and manpower 
represent two of the largest operating and support costs. 
As such, the assumptions associated with these two cost 
elements should be cause for concern.  The assumptions are 
related to reliability and maintainability issues of the 
system.  From the assumptions, cost drivers are developed to 
assist in estimating these costs for some future time 
period.  The cost-estimates are then consolidated to form 
the total life-cycle cost estimate which serves as the 
baseline cost-estimate for that system and is compared to 
the total life-cycle cost estimate of competing systems. 
The importance of these assumptions becomes very obvious. 
If the cost drivers are based upon incorrect assumptions, 
then the chances that the cost drivers and the associated 
cost-estimates may also be incorrect, are increased.  This 
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can result in funding shortfalls in the middle of the 
system's life-cycle. 
E. DISPOSAL COST 
Disposal costs include any and all considerations 
necessary to retire a system once it has reached the end of 
its useful life.  Retirement is inevitable and though the 
costs associated with it are small relative to the other 
costs of the system, theses costs are on the rise.  Current 
and emerging environmental protection laws have increased 
the costs of disposal over the last few years.  That trend 
is likely to continue into the future.  Therefore, cost of 
disposal should nevertheless be incorporated into the 
overall system cost when disposal or retirement is 
necessary. 
F. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIFE-CYCLE COST AND SYSTEM 
READINESS 
The issue of affordability not only applies to the 
procurement of the system (system can be bought at an 
affordable price) but also applies to the operation and 
supportability of that system at an affordable price.  The 
LCC estimates must demonstrate whether a system meets 
affordability goals; i.e., that it can be procured, operated 
and supported efficiently and effectively within the 
programmed and budgeted resources in the years of required 
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operation.51  To accomplish this, relevant costs associated 
with the operation and support of the fielded system must be 
part of the overall cost estimate.  As stated in the prior 
paragraphs, 85 percent of the system's life-cycle cost has 
been committed by design and logistics choices made prior to 
Milestone II.  It becomes intuitively obvious that the use 
of life-cycle costs in the early phases of the acquisition 
process would be the most effective.  Experience has shown 
that the most cost-effective approach to minimizing 
increases in operations and support costs is to design the 
systems with support requirements in mind. The current DoD 
guidelines require the acquisition of systems which meet 
performance and readiness objectives at an affordable 
life-cycle cost.52 
Clearly, the decisions with the greatest chance of 
affecting life-cycle costs and identifying savings are those 
decisions impacting acquisition and operating and support 
costs undertaken during the pre-concept, Concept 
Exploration, and Demonstration/Validation phases.53  After 
the Demonstration/Validation phase, it becomes increasingly 
more difficult and expensive to change a design element to 
accommodate cost savings in the future.  This undoubtedly 
forces a trade-off between performance and readiness 
objectives or, more specifically, between acquisition costs 
and O&S costs.  This relationship is best described 
graphically as depicted in Figure 8.54  It can be seen that 
generally, the more the cost of acquiring (procuring) the 
system, the less the associated cost of operating and 
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supporting that system.  The rationale behind this 
phenomenon is simple: The better the design of a system, the 
fewer maintainability and reliability issues.  This, of 
course, equates to the more money spent on that top of the 
line system now, the less money required to be spent later 
for the operation and support of that system. 
Life-cycle cost analysis assists in dealing with this 
trade-off issue by evaluating the cost implications of 
various design and logistic support alternatives.53 Early 
in the acquisition process, the life-cycle cost analysis 
focuses on the design cost-drivers in an effort to quantify 
the costs associated with design alternatives which provide 
the required level of performance.  The analysis, however, 
goes one step deeper.  The supportability and readiness 
objectives are also focused on at this point, along with 
their cost implications.  The cost of ownership is then 
evaluated on the basis of the acquisition cost-drivers and 
the readiness cost-drivers. 
G.  LIFE-CYCLE COST ASSUMPTIONS OF H-l ACQUISITION 
The life-cycle cost assumptions can be found in 
Appendix D for both the AH-4BW and the UH-4BN.  These 
assumptions form the baseline cost-estimate in this program. 
The cost-drivers associated with each of the more relevant 
assumptions will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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V.   COST  ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Chapter III of this thesis discussed the 
cost-estimation techniques currently employed by NAVAIR and 
DoD.  Decision-makers must use the cost-estimates developed 
by the analyst to support most, if not all, of the decisions 
in the acquisition cycle.  These cost-estimates are based on 
assumptions about the predicted operation of the system 
being acquired.  As explained previously, if the underlying 
assumptions are flawed, then most likely the cost-estimate 
will also be flawed.  In predicting the future operation of 
these systems, planners' and cost analysts' assumptions are 
based on forecasted factors that are often treated as if 
they were known with certainty.  For example, in our case 
study program, one of the operations and support cost 
elements, component repair, is based on the assumption that 
the fatigue life of the components is 10,000 hours of 
operation.  This represents an average number of hours and 
is treated as a deterministic value when used to generate 
the cost-estimate relationship and the subsequent 
cost-estimate.  Suppose a more realistic value to use is 
8,000 hours, which is based on a probabilistic forecast and 
reflects the most likely value over a specific length of 
time?  What would be the impact of this revised assumption 
on the overall O&S costs for the entire life-cycle of the 
system? 
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Treating these assumption factors as deterministic may 
be an acceptable practice for relatively short-term 
commitments.  In fact, when coupled with adjustments based 
on the experience of that planner or analyst, the method 
described above may be preferred for short-term decisions. 
However, as the overall period forecasted becomes longer, 
the element of uncertainty becomes larger, increasing the 
potential for more variations in the cost-drivers. 
Therefore, decisions with longer-term impacts are generally 
riskier than those of the shorter-term variety. 
Chapter IV discussed the concept of life-cycle cost and 
its impact on evaluating the acquisition of competing 
systems.  It was also discussed that the operating and 
support costs now comprise approximately 60% of the LCC for 
the system.  In our case study program, the aircraft being 
acquired can expect to be in operation until the year 2020. 
The twenty or so years of operation has a corresponding 
long-term O&S cost that must be estimated prior to the 
acquisition strategy being implemented.  This is to say that 
accurate cost-estimates based on accurate forecasting 
assumptions and techniques must be applied early enough in 
the acquisition cycle to assist the PM with the decision 
between these competing strategies. 
As previously stated, these acquisition decisions are 
based mainly on cost and effectiveness.  For the purpose of 
this analysis, the alternatives are compared on the basis of 
equal-effectiveness.  Although some alternative systems may 
posses higher capabilities than others, alternative 
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selection is predicated on the system meeting some preset 
performance requirement or threshold.  Once the 
effectiveness threshold has been met, alternative systems 
can then be compared on the basis of forecasted operating 
and support costs.  If the threshold is not met, the system 
is removed from consideration.  The thresholds represent the 
minimum acceptable performance that could be tolerated in 
the system in question and have been developed by NAVAIR as 
part of their effectiveness analysis for this program. 
Cost inputs to the analysis should be validated to 
identify the weaknesses or "soft areas" in the 
cost-estimate.54  Weaknesses include poor cost-estimating 
relationships (CERs) used in the inputs, treatment of 
cost-estimates as deterministic inputs into the analysis, 
and cost inputs that do not reflect the entire range of 
relevant costs.  It is obvious that the last weakness listed 
will render the analysis incomplete and the first weakness 
will cause inaccuracies in the input data. However, the 
tendency to treat the resulting cost-estimate as a 
deterministic input to the analysis can also cause very 
large amount of errors. 
The purpose of this analysis is to offer the Program 
Manager decision support tools which focus on analytical 
techniques for decision-making.  The methods described are 
quantitative in nature but may also be used to derive 
qualitative results.  The scope of the analysis is limited 
to the operations and support costs associated with the 
recapitalization of the HMLA assets.  Research and 
65 
development costs, acquisition costs, and disposal costs are 
treated as known quantities and held constant throughout the 
analysis.  These costs could be included in the analysis to 
obtain an even more realistic life-cycle cost.  However, 
that would necessitate building a much more complex model 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  This thesis 
focuses on the impact of the long-term O&S costs on 
selection of alternative acquisition strategies. 
B.   COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Cost analysis can be accomplished by using objective 
means, such as statistical analysis, or subjective means, 
such as the use of expert opinion, or a combination of the 
two.  The subjective analysis is perhaps the simplest, but 
not necessarily the least useful type of analysis.  For most 
short-term decisions, where the cost of developing the model 
may out weigh the benefits gained, a subjective analysis may 
be more than adequate.  A totally subjective analysis, 
however, may introduce both personal bias or preference and 
misconceptions based on prior experience.  Extreme caution 
should be exercised when relying on the results of this type 
of analysis.  Objective analysis, on the other hand, is 
based on models.  Models are representations of an actual or 
conceptual system that involves mathematics, logical 
expressions, or computer simulations.55  They can be used in 
a variety of applications at several different levels.  One 
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of the most useful applications is the "what if" or 
sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis uses the inherent capabilities of 
a spreadsheet application to build a model which represents 
some real-world system or process.  The cost sensitivity 
analysis is based on the degree of change in cost that 
results from changes in certain operating parameters of the 
system.  Take the example of the component repair.  Based on 
the case study program LCC assumptions, the average time 
between failures of a component is 10,000 hours.  The 
cost-estimate of the repair will remain fixed, since the 
cost is based on  repairing that component and not the 
number of components repaired.  However, if the 10,000 hour 
value is changed to say, 8,000 hours, the most obvious and 
immediate effect is that the component must now be replaced 
and repaired more frequently.  This in turn will increase 
the operating and support costs of the system over its 
entire useful life by some amount.  The spreadsheet model 
allows the analyst to vary these parameters rather 
effortlessly. 
The model, built in Lotus 1-2-3 Release 5 For Windows, 
and the results of the analysis are contained in Appendix 
F.  It is important to note that the model used in this 
analysis is very simple and as a result, very limited. 
This, however, is by design and also the result of limited 
data availability.  The objective is to provide an 
appreciation for the use of these techniques in complex 
decision-making.  The model is constructed using data and 
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assumptions provided by NAVAIR.  The data, however, is 
limited to the aggregate costs of the major LCC categories. 
Had more detailed data been available, the model could 
reflect a decomposition of the O&S costs and their 
assumptions similar to the cost element breakdown structure 
in Appendix B, instead of the gross total O&S cost-estimate. 
The inclusion of these elements at that level of 
subdivision, would greatly enhance the capabilities of the 
model. 
C.   COST UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
Cost uncertainty is an inherent element in the 
cost-estimate.  The uncertainty is rooted in the potential 
for unplanned and unforeseen systems changes, schedule 
changes, and estimating errors.  Early in the acquisition 
cycle, the impact of this uncertainty on the cost-estimate 
can be overwhelming.  In an effort to get beyond this, the 
effects of uncertainty on cost is treated as probabilistic 
vice deterministic.  This is accomplished by allowing the 
underlying assumptions of the cost-estimates to take on 
values that reflect some type of probability of occurrence. 
These values are then used as the basis for the 
cost-estimating relationship and an overall cost-estimate 
can be developed which has the highest probability of 
occurring.  As previously noted in Chapter III, simulation 
is a method of achieving this forecast. 
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NAVAIR-estimated O&S life-cycle costs are depicted 
graphically in Appendix E.  The O&S cost for the AH-4BW is 
$6.5 billion and $2.54 billion for the UH-4BN.  Many of the 
underlying assumptions are based on the expert opinion of 
the analyst, generally in the form of adjustments to 
parametric or ROM cost-estimates.  This does not imply that 
the opinion and experience of the analysts or the methods 
used are worthless.  On the contrary, expert opinion is 
vital to the decision-making process.  However, expert 
opinion all to often assumes factors will remain the same 
over time and more importantly, that these factors are 
deterministic in nature.  The results of the two methods 
will be compared and contrasted. 
Simulation allows the analyst to take the sensitivity 
analysis one step further.  Instead of choosing a value 
randomly and observing the results, simulation allows the 
choosing of many values randomly and a determination of 
which values occurs most frequently.  With the advent of 
the microcomputer, this simulation can now be performed very 
easily and quickly.  Returning to the case study example, 
suppose a value of 6,500 hours was determined to be the most 
frequent occurrence of component fatigue life.  This value 
can be said to be the most likely failure time of the 
component in question.  This value could then be replaced 
back into the model to obtain a revised overall 
cost-estimate for the repair of the component over the life 
of the system.  Also, the effects of economies of scale can 
be built into the model which can reflect a decrease in the 
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cost per unit as a result of learning curve or increase in 
inventory levels. 
The simulation tool used for this analysis is Crystal 
Ball, a simulation add-in software package for Lotus 1-2-3 
and Microsoft Excel.  Crystal Ball, developed by 
Decisioneering Inc, is based on Monte Carlo simulation and 
effectively extends the forecasting capability of the model 
by allowing the assumptions to be treated as random 
variables.  This allows the assumptions to be displayed as a 
range of possible outcomes with the probability of achieving 
each outcome.  The versatility of Crystal Ball allows the 
analyst to choose from 12 different probability 
distributions and make a selection based on the conditions 
of the model and available data.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, only the normal, triangular, and uniform 
distributions were used in an effort to match the 
assumptions to the data.  The rationale behind each 
distribution selection and corresponding assumption follows. 
Rationale for selection of a normal distribution: 
♦ Some value, such as the NAVAIR assumption value, is the 
most likely value and the mean of the distribution. 
♦ The assumption value is as likely to be above the mean 
as below the mean. 
♦ The assumption value is more likely to be near the mean 
than far away. 
The normal distribution was used for the inflation factor 
assumption because of its ability to represent many 
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different randomly occurring events.  For the normal 
distribution, Crystal Ball's default value of the mean 
divided by ten was used as the standard deviation.  This was 
accepted due to the lack of availability of the actual 
standard deviation.  The software package allows the value 
to be easily changed to a value determined by the analyst. 
Rationale for the selection of a triangular 
distribution: 
♦ The minimum and maximum values of the assumption 
variable are fixed. 
♦ The most likely value of the assumption variable falls 
between the minimum and maximum values, such that any 
value near the minimum or maximum is less likely to 
occur than those near the most likely value. 
The triangular distribution was used both for the number of 
flight hours per aircraft per year and the projected 
life-cycle assumptions.  The number of flight hours per 
aircraft per year variable assumed values between 0 and 480, 
with the most likely value the same as the NAVAIR assumption 
value.  The purpose was to provide a range from zero hours 
flown to 40 hours flown per month.  The project life-cycle 
had a minimum and maximum value of 15 years and 25 years 
respectively.  Once again, the NAVAIR assumption value was 
treated as the most likely value.  This allowed some 
consideration to be given to the uncertainty surrounding the 
development of the follow-on aircraft. 
Rationale for the selection of a uniform distribution: 
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♦ The assumption factor is a probabilistic variable whose 
value has an equal probability of occurrence as any 
other value in the distribution. 
♦ The shape of the distribution is defined by two fixed 
end points and an equal probability of occurrence. 
The uniform distribution was used to define the assumption 
of a percentage of cost savings associated with the decrease 
in avionics repair from reduced vibration.  The endpoints 
were given as 0% and 25%. 
Crystal Ball allows the analyst the capability to 
determine how many trials to run for each simulation; for 
this model the number of trials used was 2,500.  The results 
of the simulation were as follows: the overall O&S cost for 
the AH-4BW was $6.24 billion with a 8.5% chance of occuring, 
and $2.56 billion with a 9.2% chance of occurring for the 
UH-4BN.  These values correspond to the value which had the 
highest frequency of occurrence during the simulation.  The 
percentage represents the frequency of that value divided by 
the number of total trials.  The cumulative frequencies 
represent the total probability that the cost lies somewhere 
between zero and the value.  For example, for the UH-4BN, 
there is a 62% chance that the cost is between zero and 
$2,400 million. 
In addition to the frequency graphs, Crystal Ball 
provides the capacity to conduct sensitivity analysis and 
determine which assumption variables have the greatest 
influence upon the forecasted O&S cost.  This is graphically 
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depicted with the sensitivity charts in Appendix F.  The 
larger the value associated with the assumption variable in 
the chart, the greater the relative influence on the 
forecasted value.  As might be expected, the number of 
flight hours per aircraft per year had the largest impact on 
the forecast. 
D.   OTHER COST ANALYSES 
There are other less in-depth analyses that can be 
performed separately or in conjunction with the methods 
described above and may yield some rather useful data for 
supporting cost-significant decisions.  The basis of these 
analyses was discussed in Chapter III.  An example of their 
possible use in this case study follows. 
1.  Net Present Value 
Time value of money analysis is a very useful concept 
when dealing with long-range plans or long-term commitments. 
By treating the O&S costs in the outyears of the budget as 
future cash outflows, we can take the average annual cost, 
adjust it for the effects of a forecasted inflation rate and 
the forecast of any other factor which could affect this 
cost, and generate a cost in "then year" dollars.  Other 
factors would include issues that affect the individual 
elements of the O&S costs separately.  For instance, 
forecasted labor rates and learning curve theory on civilian 
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Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) personnel.  This new cost would 
represent how much it will cost to operate and support the 
system in each of the out years.  This approach is more 
accurate than just using an average O&S cost over the life 
of the system. 
2.  Linear Regression 
One of the many constraints of our case study program 
is the requirement that the LCC not rise above the levels 
used on the current system. An analysis based on linear 
regression allows us to use past data from O&M and MILPERS 
appropriations for the last 10 to 20 years, establish a 
trend, perform linear regression to obtain a relationship in 
the form of an equation, then forecast the amount of these 
appropriations anytime into the future.  This is by no means 
the most accurate method of performing this task, however, 
it does provide a rough snapshot estimate of available 
funding.  The forecasted LCC can then be compared to the 
forecasted appropriations data to derive a relationship in 
the form of a ratio.  This relationship can also be derived 
for the trend data.  The resulting ratios can then be 
compared and evaluated to provide feedback in an effort to 
remain within the desired limits. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The spreadsheet model developed for this thesis allows 
the analyst to quickly and easily calculate the operations 
and support costs associated with the acquisition of a 
system during any time in the acquisition cycle.  This 
calculation is based upon several assumptions which are 
treated as probabilistic variables in the model.  The model 
can be constructed to take all of the LCC elements into 
consideration along with their inherent assumptions.  With a 
basic understanding of probability, the simulation add-in 
software allows the analyst to go beyond the basic 
subjective solution derived from the deterministic, analyst- 
adjusted cost-estimate. 
The strength of the model lies in its ability to 
provide the analyst with a tool to quickly and easily 
estimate life-cycle costs associated with competing 
alternative acquisition strategies.  The model can be 
adjusted for a host of uncertainties, thereby reducing a 
portion of the risk involved in long-term endeavors. 
The weakness of the model lies in its dependence on the 
quality of the assumption variables.  The accuracy of the 
forecast is directly reflected in availability and 
plausibility of the assumptions.  This model's lack of 
complexity is a testament to that statement.  If many of the 
other assumptions had been available, the model would have 
75 
been able to provide a more accurate forecast for the two 
systems discussed and accurate LCC forecasts for the 
alternative systems.  However, there will be a cost 
associated with developing these assumptions.  In an event, 
the cost associated with making the model more reliable 
should not outweigh the benefit gained. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
A more detailed evaluation of the underlying assumption 
is necessary to provide the model the most accurate input 
possible.  As mentioned above, one weakness of this approach 
is that much is dependent upon the assumptions and their 
values.  The probability distribution used and the values 
used in those distributions are all developed from the 
assumptions. 
The merit of these analytical techniques is clear. The 
next step in the evolution of decision analysis should be 
taken without hesitation.  The development of 
knowledge-based decision support systems (KSS) is already 
underway.  These systems are developed as shells that are 
both reusable and generic to a particular type of 
acquisition project.  KSS can deliver information, produce 
reliable answers quickly, reduce the costs associated with 
the generation of information, make more effective use of 
existing models and data bases, result in better decisions, 
facilitate better presentations of recommendations, and 
function as a library for models and data.56  The U. S. 
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Coast Guard has already initiated a project to develop KSS 
for its acquisition decisions. 
C.  FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS 
The question this thesis attempted to answer has 
surfaced a flurry of other issues.  This was an expected 
outcome of the research.  One area of particular concern is 
the manpower issues surrounding the acquisition strategies. 
Had the manning level requirements data been available, an 
assumption variable could have been developed and included 
in the model.  This may have had a large impact on the O&S 
cost.  The sensitivity analysis would have reflected the 
relative sensitivity of this variable on the model. 
Training and maintenance manning are key issues that 
need to be resolved.  With the addition of a H-6 0 fleet in 
the Marine Corps, will the long-term costs associated with 
training the mechanics, acquiring the correct number of 
personnel in the right mix to support the aircraft, and the 
HMLA-unique three-way split of the squadron assets for 
deployment, cause an increase in the life cycle costs of the 
H-60?  The model could be developed to project this 
situation. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY 
acquisition category -  Categories established to facilitate 
decentralized decision making and execution and compliance 
with statutorily imposed requirements.  The categories 
determine the level of review, decision authority, and 
applicable procedures 
acquisition life cycle - Five phases, each proceeded by a 
milestone or other decision point, during which a systems 
goes through research, development, test and evaluation and 
production.  These five phases are: (1) Concept 
Exploration/Definition, (2) Demonstration and Validation, 
(3) Engineering and Manufacturing and Development, (4) 
Production and Deployment and (5) Operations and Support. 
acquisition strategy - A business and technical management 
approach designed to achieve program objectives within 
resource constraints imposed.  It is the framework for 
planning, directing, and managing a program.  It provides a 
master schedule for research, development, test, production, 
fielding and other activities essential for program success, 
and for formulating functional plans, and strategies, e.g., 
Test and evaluation Master Plan, Acquisition Plan, 
competition, prototyping, etc. 
B 
baseline - Defined quantity or quality used as starting 
point for subsequent efforts and progress measurement.  Can 
be a technical cost or schedule baseline.  See Performance 
Measurement Baseline and Acquisition Program Baseline. 
baseline cost estimate - A detailed estimate of acquisition 
and ownership costs normally required for high level 
decisions.  This estimate is performed early in the program 
and serves as the basepoint for all subsequent tracking and 
auditing purposes. 
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budget - A comprehensive financial plan for the Federal 
Government, encompassing the totality of Federal receipts 
and outlays (expenditures).  The budget documents routinely 
include the on-budget and off-budget amounts and combine 
them to derive a total of Federal fiscal activity, and the 
focus of the budget documents is on the combined totals. 
Also a plan of operations for a fiscal period in terms of 
(a) estimated costs, obligations, and expenditures; (b) 
source of funds for financing including anticipated 
reimbursements and other resources; and (c) history and 
workload data for the projected program and activities. 
commonality - A quality which applies to material or systems 
possessing like and interchangeable characteristics enabling 
each to be utilized or operated and maintained by personnel 
trained on the others without additional specialized 
training; and/or having interchangeable repair parts and/or 
components; and applying to consumable items interchangeably 
equivalent without adjustment. 
cost analysis - An analysis and evaluation of each element 
of cost in a contractor's proposal to determine 
reasonableness. 
cost analysis improvement group - Organization within the 
office of the ASD (PA&E) which advises the DAB on matters 
concerning the estimation, review and presentation of cost 
analysis of future weapon systems.  The CAIG also develops 
common cost estimating procedures for DoD. 
cost avoidance - An action taken in the immediate time frame 
that will decrease costs in the future.  For example, an 
engineering improvement that increases the mean time between 
failures and thereby decreasing operating support costs can 
be described as a cost avoidance action.  It is possible for 
the engineering change to incur higher costs in the 
immediate time frame.  As long as net total life cycle costs 
are less, it is a cost avoidance action.  The amount of the 
cost avoidance is determined as the difference between two 
80 
estimated cost patterns, one before the change and the one 
after. 
cost and operational effectiveness analysis - An analysis of 
the costs and operational effectiveness of alternative 
material systems to meet a mission need and the associated 
program for acquiring each alternative. 
cost/benefit - A criterion for comparing programs and 
alternatives when benefits can be valued in dollars.  Also 
referred to as benefit-cost ratio which is a function of 
equivalent benefits and equivalent costs.  Useful in the 
search for an optimal program mix which produces the 
greatest number of benefits over costs. 
cost breakdown structure - A system for subdividing a 
program into (a) hardware elements and sub-elements; (b) 
functions and subfunctions; and (c) cost categories to 
provide for more effective management and control of the 
program. 
cost effectiveness - A measure of the operational capability 
added by a system as a function of its life-cycle cost. 
cost estimate - A judgment or opinion regarding cost of an 
object, commodity or service.  A result of product of an 
estimating procedure which specifies the expected dollar 
cost required to perform a stipulated task or to acquire an 
item.  A cost estimate may constitute a single value or a 
range of values. 
cost estimating relationship - A mathematical relationship 
that defines cost as a function of one or more parameters 
such as performance, operating characteristics, physical 
characteristics, etc. 
cost model - A compilation of cost estimating logic that 
aggregates cost estimating details into a total cost 
estimate. 
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design-to-cost - Management concept wherein rigorous cost 
goals are established during development and the control of 
systems costs (acquisition, operating, and support) to these 
goals is achieved by practical tradeoffs between operational 
capability, performance, costs and schedule.  Cost, as a key 
design parameter, is addressed on a continuing basis and as 
an inherent part of the development and production process. 
disposal - The act of getting rid of excess, surplus, scrap, 
or salvage property under proper authority.  Disposal may be 
accomplished by, but not limited to, transfer, donation, 
sale, declaration, abandonment, or destruction. 
economies of scale - Reductions in unit cost of output 
resulting from the production of additional units.  Stem 
from (1) increased specialization of labor as volume of 
output increases, (2) decreased unit costs of materials, (3) 
better utilization of management, (4) acquisition of more 
efficient equipment, and (5) greater use of by-products. 
effective competition - A marketplace condition that results 
when two or more manufacturing sources are acting 
independently of each other. 
effectiveness - The extent to which the goals of the system 
are attained, or the degree to which a system can be elected 
to achieve a set of specific mission requirements.  Also, an 
output of the cost effectiveness analysis. 
flyaway costs - Costs related to production of a useable end 
item of military hardware.  Includes the cost of procuring 
the basic unit (airframe, hull, chassis, etc.), an allowance 
for changes, propulsion equipment, electronics, armament, 
and other installed government-furnished equipment, and 
nonrecurring "start-up" production costs.  Equates to 
Rollaway and Sailaway cost. 
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initial spares - Items procured for logistics support of a 
system during its initial period of operation. 
integrated logistic support - A disciplined, unified, and 
iterative approach to the management and technical 
activities necessary to integrate support considerations 
into system and equipment design; develop support 
requirements that are related consistently to readiness 
objectives, to design, and to each other, acquire the 
required support; and provide the required support during 
the operational phase at minimum cost. 
learning/improvement curve - A mathematical way to explain 
and measure the rate of change of cost (in hours or dollars) 
as a function of quantity. 
life-cycle cost - The total cost to the government of 
acquisition and ownership of that system over its useful 
life.  It includes the cost of development, acquisition, 
support, and, where applicable, disposal. 
long-lead items/long-lead time materials - Those components 
of a system or piece of equipment for which the times to 
design and fabricate are the longest, and, therefore, to 
which an early commitment of funds may be desirable in order 
to meet the earliest possible data of system completion. 
Might be ordered during EMD to arrive for production start. 
M 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force A task organization of Marine 
forces (division, aircraft wing and service support groups) 
under a single command and structured to accomplish a 
specific mission.  The MAGTF components will normally 
include command, aviation combat, ground combat, and combat 
service support elements (including Navy Support Elements). 
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N 
non-recurring costs - (1) costs which are not proportional 
to the number of units produced.  (2) a one-time costs that 
will occur on a periodic basis for the same organization. 
Nonrecurring costs include (a) preliminary design effort; 
(b) design engineering (c) all partially completed reporting 
elements manufactured for tests; (3) training of service 
instructor personnel. 
operating and support (O&S) cost - Those resources required 
to operate and support (O&S) a system, subsystem, or a major 
component during its useful life in the operational 
inventory. 
operational requirements document - Documents the users 
objectives and minimum acceptable requirements for 
operational performance of a proposed concept or system. 
Format has been standardized across all DoD components by 
DoDI 5000.11 and DoD 5000.2-M. 
reliability - The ability of a system and its part to 
perform its mission without failure, degradation, or demand 
on the support system. 
S 
simulation - A simulation is a method for implementing a 
model.  It is the process of conducting experiments with a 
model for the purpose of understanding the behavior of the 
system modeled under the selected conditions or of 
evaluating various strategies for the operation of the 
system within the limits imposed by developmental or 
operational criteria.  simulation may include the use of 
analog or digital devices, laboratory models, or "testbed" 
sites.  Simulations are usually programmed for solution on a 
computer; however, in the broadest sense, military exercises 
and wargames are also simulations. 
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supportability - The degree to which system design 
characteristics and planned logistics resources, including 
manpower, meet system peacetime readiness and wartime 
utilization requirements. 
V 
validation - (1) the process by which the contractor (or as 
otherwise directed by the DoD component procuring activity) 
tests a TM for technical accuracy and adequacy.  (2) the 
procedure of comparing input and output against an edited 
file and evaluating the result of the comparison by means of 
a decision table established as a standard.  (3) the process 
by which the preparing activity for a document determines 
that the document reflects. 
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APPENDIX B. ALTERNATIVE AIRCRAFT OVERVIEW 
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APPENDIX   C.    O&S   COST   ELEMENT   BREAKDOWN   STRUCTURE 
Section  I.     O&S  Cost  Elements 
CEBS Level 
# 12   3   4 
00 00    Operating and Support 
10 0 0 Personnel 
1100 Officers 
1110 Pilots 
1120 Non-Pilots 
1200 Enlisted 
1210 Aircrew 
122 0 Squadron Administration and Operations 
123 0 Maintenance Supervision 
124 0 Maintenance Administration 
1250 O-Level Direct Maintenance 
1260 T-Level Direct Maintenance 
2 00 0 Operating Consumables 
2100 POL 
22 00 Training Expendables 
3 000 Maintenance Consumables 
3100 Airframe 
32 00 Avionics 
33 00 Power Plant 
3400 Other (Specify) 
4 000 Depot Maintenance 
4100 Airframe Rework 
4200 Engine Repair/Rework 
43 00 Component Repair 
4310 Airframe 
4320 Avionics 
4400 Other (Specify) 
5000 Replenishment Spares 
5100 Airframe 
93 
5200        Avionics 
5300        Power Plant 
5400        Other (Specify) 
6 0 00 Support Equipment Maintenance 
700 0 Training Equipment Maintenance 
8 000 Software Support 
9000 Contractor Support Personnel 
9100        Contractor Maintenance Support Personnel 
9200        Contractor Logistics Support Personnel 
94 
Section II.  Definitions 
1000  Personnel - The cost of full the complement of 
personnel required to operate and support the squadron.  It 
includes the number of personnel necessary to meet combat 
readiness, training and administrative requirements such as 
leave, sickness, TDY, etc.  Both the cost and number of 
people should be presented for all levels of personnel in 
this cost element structure. 
1100  Officers - The cost and number of the full complement 
of officer personnel required to operate and support the 
squadron. 
1110  Pilots - The cost and number of squadron Aviation 
Officer Pilots. 
1120  Non-Pilots - The cost and number of squadron officers 
who are not pilots. 
1200  Enlisted - The cost and number of the full complement 
of enlisted personnel required to operate and support the 
squadron. 
1210 Aircrew - The cost and number of squadron enlisted 
personnel assigned aircrew billets. 
1220  Squadron Administration and Operations - The cost and 
number of squadron enlisted personnel in the administrative, 
executive, operations, integrated services, etc. 
departments. 
123 0 Maintenance Administration - The cost and number of 
squadron enlisted personnel whose duties are associated with 
clerical, material control, quality assurance and with I 
level administration. 
124 0 Maintenance Supervision - The cost and number of 
squadron enlisted personnel who direct and supervise 0 level 
maintenance requirements (e.g., electronics maintenance 
supervisor, safety equipment maintenance supervisor, or 
power plant maintenance supervisor). 
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12 50  0 Level Direct Maintenance - The cost and number of 
squadron enlisted personnel associated with direct 
maintenance of squadron aircraft at the organizational 
level.  Duties include performance of scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance and support actions associated with 
direct maintenance of squadron aircraft plus the associated 
tasks required for set up, transportation, servicing, 
turnaround, inspection, and supply/maintenance records 
transactions. 
1260  I Level Direct Maintenance - The cost and number of 
enlisted personnel associated with all intermediate level 
direct maintenance of squadron aircraft.  Duties include 
performance of I level maintenance plus the associated tasks 
required for set up, transportation, inspection, and 
supply/maintenance records transactions.  These personnel 
may not all be assigned to the squadron, they may be part of 
a SEA-OP-DET. 
2 000  Operating Consumables - The cost of consumables used 
in operating the aircraft and it's associated equipment. 
2100  POL - The cost of aviation petroleum, oil and 
lubricants (POL) required to support the peacetime flying 
hour program. 
22 00  Training Expendables - The cost of items expended by 
the squadron in peacetime training operations.  Includes 
such items as live and inert ammunition, bombs, rockets, 
missiles, torpedoes and sonobuoys. 
3 000  Maintenance Consumables - The cost of all 
non-repairable (consumable) material used in organizational 
and intermediate maintenance and support of squadron 
aircraft.  Excludes the cost of repairable items that are 
attrited, as this cost is included in replenishment spares. 
3100  Airframe - The cost of all maintenance consumables 
associated with the airframe. 
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3200  Avionics - The cost of all maintenance consumables 
associated with the avionics. 
3300  Power Plant - The cost of all maintenance consumables 
associated with the power plant. 
3400  Other - The cost of all maintenance consumables not 
covered by the above definitions. 
4000  Depot Maintenance - The total cost of labor, material 
and overhead for depot level maintenance of the aircraft 
airframe, engine and components. 
4100  Airframe Rework - The total cost including labor, 
material and overhead of depot level rework, including both 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance to assure the required 
material condition of the airframe.  This would include 
Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) which consists of 
depot level rework at specific intervals during the 
aircraft's service life.  Also included are depot level 
inspections such as Age Exploration and Aircraft Service 
Period Adjustment and their associated maintenance. 
4200  Engine Repair/Rework - The total cost, including 
labor, material and overhead of scheduled and unscheduled 
depot level repair and rework of the engine, engine modules 
and engine components. 
4300  Component Repair/Rework - The total cost including 
labor, material and overhead of depot level component repair 
and rework covering both scheduled periodic maintenance and 
unscheduled maintenance of airframe and avionics components. 
4310  Airframe - The cost of airframe component repair and 
rework. 
4320  Avionics - The cost of avionics component repair and 
rework. 
44 00  Other - The cost of any depot level maintenance not 
covered by the above definitions. 
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5000  Replenishment Spares - The cost of replacing normally 
repairable items that are disposed of in attrition and depot 
survey as beyond economical repair. 
5100  Airframe - The cost of all replenishment spares 
associated with the airframe. 
5200  Avionics - The cost of all replenishment spares 
associated with the avionics. 
5300  Power Plant - The cost of all replenishment spares 
associated with the power plant. 
54 0 0  Other - The cost of all replenishment spares not 
associated with the above definitions. 
600 0  Support Equipment Maintenance - The total cost of 
maintaining common and peculiar support equipment which is 
used to support aircraft at all levels of maintenance. 
700 0  Training Equipment Maintenance - The total cost of 
maintaining all program training equipment at all levels of 
maintenance. 
80 0 0  Software Support - The cost of maintaining and 
updating all weapon system computer programs.  Includes the 
cost associated with the aircraft, support and test 
equipment, flight trainers, and any other system software. 
9000  Contractor Support Personnel - The cost of contractor 
personnel required to perform maintenance and logistics 
support functions. 
9100  Contractor Maintenance Support Personnel - The cost of 
contractor personnel required to support maintenance 
functions.  Both the cost and number of personnel should be 
presented by function.  Contract personnel performing full 
time maintenance functions at the depot level should be 
documented as a depot cost. 
9200  Contractor Logistics Support Personnel - The cost of 
contractor personnel performing logistics functions such as 
98 
supply support, management, etc.  Both the cost and number 
of personnel should be presented by function. 
i 
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APPENDIX D. LIFE-CYCLE COST ASSUMPTIONS 
Section I.  Attack Helicopter 
Aircraft Fleet   230 Aircraft 
Flight Hours per Aircraft   360 hours/Year 
Modified Aircraft per Year   24 Aircraft 
Inflation   3 Percent 
AH-1W Metal Blade Life   2,200 Hours 
AH-1W Metal Blade Overhaul   1,100 Hours 
AH-1W Unscheduled Maintenance Increase  .. 8 Percent/Yr 
AH-1(4B)W Component Fatigue Lives   10,000 Hours 
AH-1(4B)W Transmission TBO   5,000 Hours 
SDLM Credit at AH-1(4B)W Modification   $200,000 
AH-1(4B)W SDLM Elimination   1 
AH-1(4B)W Follow-on SDLM Cost Reduction  .. $100,000 EA 
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Section II.  Light Assault Helicopter 
Aircraft Fleet   100 Aircraft 
Flight Hours per Aircraft   360 hours/Year 
Modified Aircraft per Year   12 Aircraft 
Inflation   3 Percent 
UH-1N Metal Blade Life   2,200 Hours 
UH-1N Metal Blade Overhaul   1,100 Hours 
UH-1N Unscheduled Maintenance Increase  .. 8 Percent/Yr 
UH-1(4B)N Component Fatigue Lives   10,000 Hours 
UH-1(4B)N Transmission TBO   5,000 Hours 
SDLM Credit at UH-1(4B)N Modification   $400,000 
UH-1(4B)N SDLM Elimination   1 
UH-1(4B)N Follow-on SDLM Cost Reduction  .. $330,000 EA 
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APPENDIX E. NAVAIR LIFE-CYCLE COST ESTIMATES 
1- 
üo 
LJJ 
O 
>- 
o 
LJJ 
LL 
> 
o 
CM 
LU 
s 
LU 
QC 
D ü 
O 
K. 
0. 
<3 
LU 
s 
0. 
LJJ 
> 
UJ 
3 
CO 
m 
CO    & 
CO 
F- 
LU 
Z 
GG 
>- 
i , 
CO in 
UJ 
UJ 
X 
m 
3 
CN I 
< 
S 
0. 
i 
x 
< 
CN lO 
ö 
^ LU  S 
5 Li 
^* O 
2 
LJJ  UJ 
< 
er a 
O 
o 
(0 
er 
SD
E 
LT
HI
 
O&
S 
UL 
00
 "- w ost 
CO O o^   lO   O 
CJ 00   «*  CM 
103 
^OT 
C/) 
_J 
o 
>- 
o 
LU 
LL 
CM 
III 
s 
111 
tr 
D 
Ü 
O 
a. 
«K Hi 
CO 
QQ 
°? 
CO 
CO m 
5   t 
CO 
h- 
LU 
2 
3 
o 
o 
IT 
X 
o "- 
o o 
CO CO ID co CNJ 
u 
h 
<; 
c 
H 
C/ 
u 
h 
a 
a 
« 
r 
m 
>- 
£ LU S! S Li ^__ 
o 
s 
to 
LU  Ul 
X 
< DE
CR
 
H
R
D
 
Ü r «Ü 
3 
o LL 
o3 U. 
O 3 
03 O S*> m 
CO r-. CD un CO        CM 
03 
O 
T- n co » (M 
X 
3 
CO —. 
et 2 
x m 
K 7 
X 
3 
X 
3 
CO 
00 
O 
cr 
< 
UJ 
>- 
o 
N   U.   T   «. 
X 
3 
O 
2 
m 
T 
x 
3 
X 
3_ 
O 
o o 
c\« o 
OQ  K 
T — 
X > 
=)  CO 
si 
xQ 
as 
o Q 
S ai 
53 w 
x Q 
OS   U) 
CM   O 
CO 
7 
X 
3 
CO 
O 
m 
—i 
o 
>■ o 
at 
u. 
2 
m 
7 
P 
7 s 2 
< CO X g"0 < 
£• z CO 
x Q oö 
< > o 
OQJ S UJ o 
55 o 
x a 
o 
UJ j_ "j n: 
o _ 
5 "- 32 
•   CM 
to     -s-     co     CN 
o 
CO    T- 
r-   CM 
UJ 
(- 
CO 
UJ 
CN 
7 
< 
o u. 
I 
X < 
105 
90T 
H 
CO 
O 
o 
LU 
o 
o 
LU 
Li. 
co 
O 
o 
z 
LU 
2 
UJ 
a: 
D 
Ü 
O 
IT 
Q. 
0£i! 
CL 
o 
-J 
UJ 
> 
LU 
D 
CO 
CQ 
^. 
CO 
o 
z 
CO 
I- 
UJ 
z 
m 
en 
CO 
o 
Z 
CO 
m 
>■   un 
I—     CM 
O 
CM 
LO 
** 
8 
£ 
. 
LT> O 
CM 4* ■:■:■ : 
w :■:■ : 
f 8 
m 
/ 
0 
T— CD 
*fr T— 4» - 
co 
C3 
CM 
Z 
> 
~, < CQ  co 
«>     — ' 
CO 
X 
< 
m 
7 
x 
Z 
o 
7 — 
X > 
CO 
u 
CD 
7 
x 
3 
3
 o 
Z 5 
CO 
«a 
O 
UJ 
Q 
UJ O 
O 
5 
o 
o r» 
t-   CM 
CM 
> o 
UJ 
u. 
3 
u. 
3 
CO 
7 
ll 
CD 2 
7 
X 
< 
S Sf 7 CQ 
X > 
<  CO 
?i 
x9 
g Q _ 
5 UJ o 
55 a > 
X 
< 
co 
sc3 
o 
UJ 
LO 
CM 
o 
CM 
IT) m 
x X 
o ^ 
CO     T- 
1-   CM 
3 
LL 
LL: 
< 
5 
H 
cr. 
LL 
c 
LL 
CT. 
> 
LL 
CC 
tX 
CN 
1 
< 
5 
0. 
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Crystal Ball Report 
Simulation started on 12/7/95 at 19:18:35 
Simulation stopped on 12/7/95 at 19:21:30 
Sensitivity Chart 
Target Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST 
# Flight Hours/Aircraft/Yr 
Projected Life-Cycle 
1.00 
-.02 I 
Percent Avionics Vibration Reduction -.01 I 
Inflation Factor .00 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 | 
Measured by Rank Correlation | 
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Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST Cell:  B25 
Summary: 
Display Range is from $0.00 to $12,000.00 
Entire Range is from $120.31 to $11,714.09 
After 2,500 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is $49.06 
Statistics: Value 
Trials 2500.00 
Mean 6117.09 
Median (approx.) 6163.13 
Mode (approx.) 5917.20 
Standard Deviation 2453.10 
Variance 6017698.24 
Skewness -0.09 
Kurtosis 2.38 
Coeff. of Variability 0.40 
Range Minimum 120.31 
Range Maximum 11714.09 
Range Width 11593.78 
Mean Std. Error 49.06 
Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST j 
Cell B25 Frequency Chart 2,500 Trials Shown 
-   z IZ 
.064 159                 j 
2     .042 
<a 
.o 
o 
*-    n?i    J || | 
-Tl    ! 
n 
.106    -a 
c 
re 
Z3 
-   53          Q 
0 
.nil II. 1 i   Q- 
.000    J .III mil ll.. ► < 
$0.00 $3,000.00 $6,000.00                   $9,000.00 $12,000.00 
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Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST (cont'd) 
Percentiles: 
Cell: B25 
Percentile Value (approx.) 
0.00% 120.31 
10.00% 2737.19 
20.00% 3883.46 
30.00% 4768.86 
40.00% 5569.39 
50.00% 6163.13 
60.00% 6779.00 
70.00% 7501.68 
80.00% 8368.46 
90.00% 9384.29 
100.00% 11714.09 
luency Counts: 
Frequency: 
Freq. Group Start Value End Value Prob. 
0 -Infinity $0.00 0.000000 
5 1 $0.00 $480.00 0.002000 
32 2 $480.00 $960.00 0.012800 
30 3 $960.00 $1,440.00 0.012000 
60 4 $1,440.00 $1,920.00 0.024000 
69 5 $1,920.00 $2,400.00 0.027600 
78 6 $2,400.00 $2,880.00 0.031200 
109 7 $2,880.00 $3,360.00 0.043600 
110 8 $3,360.00 $3,840.00 0.044000 
120 9 $3,840.00 $4,320.00 0.048000 
144 10 $4,320.00 $4,800.00 0.057600 
135 11 $4,800.00 $5,280.00 0.054000 
174 12 $5,280.00 $5,760.00 0.069600 
212 13 $5,760.00 $6,240.00 0.084800 
198 14 $6,240.00 $6,720.00 0.079200 
178 15 $6,720.00 $7,200.00 0.071200 
154 16 $7,200.00 $7,680.00 0.061600 
135 17 $7,680.00 $8,160.00 0.054000 
142 18 $8,160.00 $8,640.00 0.056800 
104 19 $8,640.00 $9,120.00 0.041600 
103 20 $9,120.00 $9,600.00 0.041200 
65 21 $9,600.00 $10,080.00 0.026000 
75 22 $10,080.00 $10,560.00 0.030000 
43 23 $10,560.00 $11,040.00 0.017200 
20 24 $11,040.00 $11,520.00 0.008000 
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Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST (cont'd) ( Dell: B25 
Freq. Group Start Value End Value Prob. 
5 25 $11,520.00 $12,000.00 0.002000 
0 $12,000.00 +Infinity 0.000000 
2500 Total 1.000000 
Cumulative: 
Freq. Group Start Value End Value Prob. 
0 
-Infinity $0.00 0.000000 
5 1 $0.00 $480.00 0.002000 
37 2 $480.00 $960.00 0.014800 
67 3 $960.00 $1,440.00 0.026800 
127 4 $1,440.00 $1,920.00 0.050800 
196 5 $1,920.00 $2,400.00 0.078400 
274 6 $2,400.00 $2,880.00 0.109600 
383 7 $2,880.00 $3,360.00 0.153200 
493 8 $3,360.00 $3,840.00 0.197200 
613 9 $3,840.00 $4,320.00 0.245200 
757 10 $4,320.00 $4,800.00 0.302800 
892 11 $4,800.00 $5,280.00 0.356800 
1066 12 $5,280.00 $5,760.00 0.426400 
1278 13 $5,760.00 $6,240.00 0.511200 
1476 14 $6,240.00 $6,720.00 0.590400 
1654 15 $6,720.00 $7,200.00 0.661600 
1808 16 $7,200.00 $7,680.00 0.723200 
1943 17 $7,680.00 $8,160.00 0.777200 
2085 18 $8,160.00 $8,640.00 0.834000 
2189 19 $8,640.00 $9,120.00 0.875600 
2292 20 $9,120.00 $9,600.00 0.916800 
2357 21 $9,600.00 $10,080.00 0.942800 
2432 22 $10,080.00 $10,560.00 0.972800 
2475 23 $10,560.00 $11,040.00 0.990000 
2495 24 $11,040.00 $11,520.00 0.998000 
2500 25 $11,520.00 $12,000.00 1.000000 
2500 $12,000.00 ^Infinity 1.000000 
End of Forecast 
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Assumptions 
Assumption: # Flight Hours/Aircraft/Yr 
Triangular distribution with parameters: 
Minimum 0.00 
Likeliest 260.40 
Maximum 480.00 
Selected range is from 3.20 to 480.00 
Mean value in simulation was 246.99 
Assumption: Inflation Factor 
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean 3.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.30% 
Selected range is from -Infinity to -«-Infinity 
Mean value in simulation was 2.99% 
Assumption: Projected Life-Cycle 
Triangular distribution with parameters: 
Minimum 15.00 
Likeliest 20.00 
Maximum 25.00 
Selected range is from 15.00 to 25.00 
Mean value in simulation was 19.98 
Cell: B9 
Assumption: Percent Avionics Vibration Reduction 
Uniform distribution with parameters: 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean value in simulation was 12.68% 
0.00% 
25.00% 
End of Assumptions 
# Flight Hours/Aircraft/Yr 
Cell: B10 
Inflation Factor 
Cell: B12 
Projected Life-Cycle 
Cell: C11 
Percent Avionics Vibration Reduction 
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Crystal Ball Report 
Simulation started on 12/7/95 at 20:12:51 
Simulation stopped on 12/7/95 at 20:15:48 
Sensitivity Chart 
Target Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST FY94$ 
# Flight Hours/Aircraft/Yr 
C34 
1.00 
-.03 
Inflation Factor -.02 I 
Projected Life-Cycle .00 
I 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 
Measured by Rank Correlation 
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Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST FY94$ Cell: B48 
Summary: 
Display Range is from 0.00 to 4,000.00 
Entire Range is from 113.04 to 3,540.65 
After 2,500 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 14.99 
Statistics: Value 
Trials 2500.00 
Mean 2060.96 
Median (approx.) 2145.94 
Mode (approx.) 2512.36 
Standard Deviation 749.48 
Variance 561716.70 
Skewness -0.36 
Kurtosis 2.38 
Coeff. of Variability 0.36 
Range Minimum 113.04 
Range Maximum 3540.65 
Range Width 3427.61 
Mean Std. Error 14.99 
Cell B48 
.092 
.069 
CO 
.a 
a 
.046 
.023 
.000 
Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST FY94$ 
Frequency Chart 2,500 Trials Shown 
230 
0.00 1,000.00 2,000.00 3,000.00 4,000.00 
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Forecast: TOTAL O&S 5COSTFY94$ (cont'd) Cell:  B48 
Percentiles: 
Percentile Value (approx.) 
0% 113.04 
10% 983.44 
20% 1368.87 
30% 1674.95 
40% 1915.96 
50% 2145.94 
60% 2357.41 
70% 2539.25 
80% 2748.49 
90% 2986.52 
100% 3540.65 
Frequency Counts: 
Frequency: 
Freq. Group Start Value End Value Prob. 
0 -Infinity 0.00 0.000000 
5 1 0.00 160.00 0.002000 
19 2 160.00 320.00 0.007600 
33 3 320.00 480.00 0.013200 
43 4 480.00 640.00 0.017200 
55 5 640.00 800.00 0.022000 
79 6 800.00 960.00 0.031600 
105 7 960.00 1,120.00 0.042000 
99 8 1,120.00 1,280.00 0.039600 
115 9 1,280.00 1,440.00 0.046000 
121 10 1,440.00 1,600.00 0.048400 
170 11 1,600.00 1,760.00 0.068000 
160 12 1,760.00 1,920.00 0.064000 
166 13 1,920.00 2,080.00 0.066400 
188 14 2,080.00 2,240.00 0.075200 
191 15 2,240.00 2,400.00 0.076400 
230 16 2,400.00 2,560.00 0.092000 
200 17 2,560.00 2,720.00 0.080000 
170 18 2,720.00 2,880.00 0.068000 
139 19 2,880.00 3,040.00 0.055600 
106 20 3,040.00 3,200.00 0.042400 
71 21 3,200.00 3,360.00 0.028400 
34 22 3,360.00 3,520.00 0.013600 
1 23 3,520.00 3,680.00 0.000400 
0 24 3,680.00 
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3,840.00 0.000000 
Forecast: TOTAL O&S COST FY94$ (cont'd) Cell: B48 
Freq. Group Start Value 
0 25 3,840.00 
0 4,000.00 
2500 Total 
Cumulative: 
Freq. Group Start Value 
0 -Infinity 
5 1 0.00 
24 2 160.00 
57 3 320.00 
100 4 480.00 
155 5 640.00 
234 6 800.00 
339 7 960.00 
438 8 1,120.00 
553 9 1,280.00 
674 10 1,440.00 
844 11 1,600.00 
1004 12 1,760.00 
1170 13 1,920.00 
1358 14 2,080.00 
1549 15 2,240.00 
1779 16 2,400.00 
1979 17 2,560.00 
2149 18 2,720.00 
2288 19 2,880.00 
2394 20 3,040.00 
2465 21 3,200.00 
2499 22 3,360.00 
2500 23 3,520.00 
2500 24 3,680.00 
2500 25 3,840.00 
2500 4,000.00 
of Forecast 
End Value Prob. 
4,000.00 0.000000 
+lnfinity 0.000000 
1.000000 
End Value Prob. 
0.00 0.000000 
160.00 0.002000 
320.00 0.009600 
480.00 0.022800 
640.00 0.040000 
800.00 0.062000 
960.00 0.093600 
1,120.00 0.135600 
1,280.00 0.175200 
1,440.00 0.221200 
1,600.00 0.269600 
1,760.00 0.337600 
1,920.00 0.401600 
2,080.00 0.468000 
2,240.00 0.543200 
2,400.00 0.619600 
2,560.00 0.711600 
2,720.00 0.791600 
2,880.00 0.859600 
3,040.00 0.915200 
3,200.00 0.957600 
3,360.00 0.986000 
3,520.00 0.999600 
3,680.00 1.000000 
3,840.00 1.000000 
4,000.00 1.000000 
+lnfinity 1.000000 
119 
Assumptions 
Assumption: # Flight Hours/Aircraft/Yr 
Triangular distribution with parameters: 
Minimum $0.00 
Likeliest $334.80 
Maximum $480.00 
Selected range is from $0.00 to $480.00 
Mean value in simulation was $274.38 
Assumption: Inflation Factor 
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean 3.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.30% 
Selected range is from -Infinity to -»-Infinity 
Mean value in simulation was 2.99% 
Cell: B32 
Assumption: Percent Avionics Vibration Reduction 
Uniform distribution with parameters: 
Minimum 0.00% 
Maximum 25.00% 
Mean value in simulation was 12.62% 
Assumption: Projected Life-Cycle 
Triangular distribution with parameters: 
Minimum 15.00 
Likeliest 20.00 
Maximum 25.00 
Selected range is from 15.00 to 25.00 
Mean value in simulation was 19.95 
End of Assumptions 
# Flight Hours/Aircraft/Yr 
Cell: B33 
Inflation Factor 
Cell: C34 
Cell: B35 
Projected Life-Cycle 
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